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The Kremlin's new leader is not likely to take bold steps to improve relations with China, end the war in Afghanistan or break the deadlock in nuclear arms negotiations, at least not immediately. Decisions within the ruling elite will continue to be made collectively; in the short term, no one man will be able to change the broad outlines of a foreign policy that predates Andropov's accession. Instead, during a time of transition, Moscow will no doubt opt for what is familiar. Explains a British diplomat: "When there is uncertainty in Moscow, the instinctive reaction is one of continuity in policies and actions, with a somewhat harder interpretation of these policies until the new leadership has time to consolidate its position." The Kremlin has little to gain in making conciliatory moves that would serve to help Reagan's re-election campaign.
The final months of Andropov's tenure were marked by a steady deterioration in both the tone and the substance of U.S.-Soviet relations. Last November, when Britain, West Germany and Italy proceeded with the planned deployment of new NATO missiles, the Soviets walked out of the Geneva talks on intermediate-range weapons in Europe. During the next three weeks, they suspended their participation in the Geneva Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and in the decade-long Vienna negotiations on conventional forces in Europe. Andropov bluntly said that the U.S. had "torpedoed" the possibility of reaching an arms accord. Reagan had a comeback of his own: "I think the evidence is clear as to which country is sincerely and honestly working toward a reduction of armaments."
Yet in the weeks before Andropov's death, both superpowers had been delicately probing the possibilities of improved relations. Meeting for five hours during the Stockholm security conference in Europe last month, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko agreed to resume the Vienna talks in March. TIME has learned that Reagan authorized Shultz to sound Gromyko out on ways to resume START, including the possibility of a new framework for an agreement that differs dramatically from the Administration's existing proposal. Although Gromyko was so intransigent that Shultz could not pursue the idea, some American foreign policy analysts have interpreted recent Soviet calls for the U.S. to match words with deeds as an expression of the Kremlin's willingness at least to consider any new American offers.
The succession is certain to sharpen debate within the Reagan Administration on how to deal with the Soviets. Some State Department officials tend to see the change in leadership as an opportunity to improve U.S.-Soviet relations by substantially modifying the U.S. START proposal to bring it closer to the Soviet position. The Pentagon, on the other hand, believes that the U.S. should not present new ideas and in effect reward the Soviets for walking out of the talks. They also suspect that the Soviet leadership is too much in disarray to negotiate an arms agreement.