(5 of 5)
Finally, the U.S. should be acutely sensitive to fundamental and widespread changes in the nature of internal opposition to right-wing rulers, particularly radicalization, growing resentment of the U.S., and an increased willingness on the part of democratic moderates to make common cause with leftist extremists. Where that happens, as it is happening now in the Philippines, the U.S. would do well to step up regular diplomatic communication with the moderates and thus help strengthen them.
The U.S. does have some influence through trade, investment and economic and military assistance. Yet its options for direct, decisive action are extremely limited, even once Washington has singled out those dictators who are heading for disaster. Arm's-length treatment can help limit the damage to U.S. interests if and when the downfall comes. But strong-arm intervention runs the risk of hastening, perhaps worsening a crisis. Dealing with a dictator means avoiding the appearance of propping him up. It does not mean actively working to bring him down, as many of his own domestic political opponents would like the U.S. to do. They might well learn the lesson that Americans have been taught so painfully in Iran and Nicaragua: whether such regimes survive or fall depends ultimately on their own subjects, not on some act of will by the U.S. Strobe Talbott
