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A large part of the challenge is to distinguish between viable authoritarian regimes and ones that are doomed, especially among those the U.S. relies on to protect regional security. Where is the status quo best sustained, and where is it a lost cause? When should the U.S. stand by a client, despite his internal regime, and when should the U.S. begin to distance itself from him? In the context of statecraft, these questions are neither moralistic nor cynical. They are a matter of differentiating between those with whom the U.S. must live and those who will try to cling to the U.S. as they go under. There are at least four guides that might help in that differentiation:
First, the U.S. should be especially wary of embracing dictatorships that have sprung up in countries with democratic traditions, like Chile and Greece. The Pinochet junta is an aberration in modern Chilean history and may well go the way of the Greek Colonels. The same could be true of Ferdinand Marcos, although democracy in the Philippines has always been fragile and turbulent. Conversely, the U.S. has little choice but to tolerate military rule where it is the norm. For example, South Korea's Park Chung Hee suppresses dissent by an "emergency decree" superficially similar to Marcos' martial law; but different versions of such measures have been the rule in South Korea, while they are a relatively recent exception in the Philippines. Similarly, Thailand for decades has run on a mixture of monarchy, military oligarchy and a mostly rubber-stamp parliamentary system, with the last by far the weakest ingredient.
Second, the U.S. has more reason to regard a strict, perhaps unsavory internal regime in a country as viable if that country faces an external threat. South Korea and Thailand both live with the clear and present danger of hostile, militarily formidable Communist neighbors. Paradoxically, the menace from North Korea and Viet Nam has galvanizing, stabilizing effects on the governments of South Korean President Park and Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak Chamanand. The Philippines, by contrast, is an island nation. Many Filipinos feel isolated from foreign enemies and therefore freer to nurture grievances against their own government and against the U.S. for its support of that government.
Third, it is wiser to support a regime in a country that has a system of succession assuring a measure of continuity than in a nation that does not. It is important to distinguish between institutionalized authoritarianism and autocracy. The latter by definition loses stability in the absence of the autocrat.
If Park or Kriangsak died or was driven from office, either would probably be replaced by yet another one of the generals from whose ranks both leaders came. The Philippines, however, has no credible mechanism to assure an orderly succession. Marcos' one-man rule recalls Louis XIV's declaration, "L 'état c 'est moi," and the warning sometimes attributed to Louis XV, "Après moi le déluge."