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Ideological Purity. Sinologists believe that Mao sympathizes with at least some of the radicals' arguments—after all, it was Mao who plunged China into the reckless adventure of the Cultural Revolution with the call "Bombard the party headquarters!" But Mao also clearly approved such departures from ideological purity as Chou's openness toward Japan and the West. Indeed, Sino-American relations, though cautious on cultural exchanges, have blossomed in the area of trade; the U.S. is now China's second-largest trading partner, after Japan. (By contrast, the Soviet Union inspires only fear in China —enough to prompt continued building of vast air-raid shelters in many of China's cities.) Although the Chairman's goals are, as always, difficult to understand, some China watchers believe that he is trying to strike a complex political balance between the radical and moderate forces. The consensus is that Mao's own strategy for the post-Mao era took shape at the Tenth Party Congress, held a little more than a year ago.
The most spectacular sign of the strategy was the rise of a former Shanghai cotton-mill worker, Wang Hung-wen, 38, from virtual obscurity to vice chairman of the party. He now ranks below only Mao and Chou in the hierarchy. Since Wang is associated with such radical faction leaders as Chiang Ching and Politburo Member Yao Wenyuan, his promotion indicated that the leftists could not simply be pushed aside as a political force.
Nonetheless, Chou En-lai and the moderates may have got the best of the bargain. Unlike Chiang Ching, who is a member of the Politburo but holds no office in the government, Wang Hung-wen has no independent power base. Some experts believe that his elevation was a token; the leftists got represen tation at the apex of the party but little increase in real power.
Balancing Wang's meteoric rise, moreover, was the re-emergence of several pragmatic bureaucrats who had been discarded during the Cultural Revolution — most important, former Party General Secretary Teng Hsiao-ping, now a Vice Premier, who in recent months has taken over many of Chou's diplomatic functions. Teng is one of four high-ranking officials (referred to by some Sinologists as "the Four Horsemen of Peking") who are expected collectively to assume Chou's manifold responsibilities if the Premier should pass from the scene. The others: Li Hsien-nien, a jowly, rumpled former Finance Minister, whose current role is overseeing economic development plans; Chang Chun-chiao, thought to be a member of Mme. Mao's leftist clique, who could take over many of Chou's day-to-day office duties; Chen Hsi-lien, a bull-like army commander and the most likely candidate for Defense Minister in any post-Chou lineup.
Stinging Rebukes. The uneasy compromise involving Chou and the radicals had one almost certain target, the power of the military establishment. Since the end of the Cultural Revolution, a number of provincial commanders had been trying to establish their hegemony over government and party organs. At the Tenth Party Congress, the military's representation on the 319-member Central Committee was trimmed from 56% to 41%. Four months later, eight of the most powerful regional army chiefs were transferred from their long-term bases of power to new, unfamiliar commands.