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Thieu was concerned about granting the Communists de facto territorial sovereignty over those areas they now occupy. He was irate that the agreement would permit the North Vietnamese troops camped on South Vietnamese soil to remain. But he seemed most concerned about the political unrest and coup-scheming that might be unleashed by a ceasefire. He seemed, doubtless with some acumen, to feel he might have more to fear from South Vietnamese politicians and factions he has hitherto ridden roughshod over than from the Communists.
Kissinger accentuated the positive. He reminded Thieu that he had a million-man military machine, a 120,000-man police force and the promise of U.S. aid continuing through the coming period of "political reconciliation." In short, Thieu had "a fighting chance."
Will Thieu go along? The Washington view is that there is less to Thieu's intransigence than appears on the surface. In order to strengthen his hand for the difficult days ahead, he is establishing himself as a Vietnamese patriot and not an American stooge. Like Hanoi, he was attempting to pressure Nixon on election eve into modifying the agreement in his favor. But what if Thieu refuses to settle? The next steps are unclear, but it is possible that the U.S. would declare that it had done what it could and then make a separate peace with Hanoi. In his briefing, Kissinger warned both Hanoi and Saigon: "We will not be stampeded into an agreement until its provisions are right. We will not be deflected from an agreement when its provisions are right."
In any case, the dash for peace has been deflected for the moment by the need to tidy up those "loose ends." Kissinger wants to speed up creation of the international supervisory machinery so that it can be operative when the ceasefire is declared. The idea is to pare down the inevitable period of bloody chaos after a cease-fire—a situation that usually works to the advantage of guerrillas rather than government.
More serious was the wrangle over the hazily defined National Council of Reconciliation and Concord. The council is billed as a three-part "administrative structure" that would appear on the scene long enough to organize elections. Thieu worries that it could become what he has always steadfastly opposed and the Communists have always demanded: a tripartite coalition government. The issue is a powerful one because the well-organized Communists might well end up first among equals in any arrangement in which they would share power with Thieu loyalists and "neutrals." The Communists may see the council as a sort of "delayed coalition" that would eventually prove to be the basis of a post-Thieu regime. If so, it would be a major concession on the U.S.'s part—and perhaps a main reason why Hanoi is so anxious to sign.