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But for its most effective ploy, Hanoi reached into Richard Nixon's bag of diplomatic tricks. Last January, in an effort to break the long impasse at the Paris negotiations (and hike up his sagging ratings in the polls), Nixon went on TV with his dramatic revelations of Kissinger's secret meetings in Paris, explaining that the disclosure might speed things along. In a similar move one afternoon late last week, Radio Hanoi flashed word that an "important statement" was coming. The broadcast that followed contained not only the first official summary of the nine-point plan but also a detailed account of the hurried negotiations that had brought it about. The U.S., Hanoi charged, was using "difficulties in Saigon" as an excuse to back out of the deal.
The provisions revealed by Hanoi—and later confirmed by Kissinger —envision an internationally supervised cease-fire in place, a withdrawal of all U.S. forces and a return of P.O.W.s in 60 days, and complex arrangements for the evolution of a political settlement among the Vietnamese (see box, page 16).
Perhaps the most startling revelation of the Communist broadcast was the details on the pace of negotiations—which suggests that Hanoi was literally sprinting for a settlement before the U.S. election on Nov. 7. The two sides worked on tight deadlines. The first target date for an agreement to be signed was Oct. 26, a scant eighteen days after the beginning of "serious" negotiations on the nine points. According to Hanoi, there were two postponements—one to Oct. 30 and another, while Kissinger was haggling with Thieu in Saigon, to Tuesday, Oct. 31. If the U.S. did not sign the agreement on the deadline, Hanoi warned, the U.S. would be "responsible for prolonging the war."
Hanoi's open gambit caught the Administration by surprise. When news of the broadcast reached Washington by 2 a.m., Kissinger called Nixon and told him what had happened. Early next morning, they met in Nixon's office and decided that the Administration would have to make its own public accounting of the talks. Shortly after the meeting, Kissinger entered the briefing room.
It was a remarkable performance. Speaking without notes—he had only a copy of the agreement before him—Kissinger addressed a number of audiences. For the U.S. electorate, there was a forcefully put case for the Administration's handling of the negotiations. "We believe that by far the longest part of the road has been traversed," he said. Yet the pace of negotiations "has not been framed by the election."