Man Of The Year: On the Road to a New Reality

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twice yearly in the future. ECONOMIC FRICTION. Although European unity is a goal endorsed and encouraged by all postwar U.S. Presidents, Washington now has mixed feelings about it. While eliminating internal tariffs, the Common Market has raised external tariffs against some American exports—one reason for the current, dangerous revival of protectionism in the U.S. British admission to the Common Market could seriously cut into U.S. farmers' $400 million-a-year market. On the other hand, an enlarged and thriving Common Market would mean greater sales and larger profits for American-owned industries in Europe. Moreover, the prospect of a strong, united Western Europe with its moral, military, economic and political forces firmly committed to the non-Communist West, is far more important than possible disadvantages to U.S. trade.

In the creation of a united Western Europe, the U.S. role remains vital. Militarily, the 285,000 U.S. troops now in Western Europe form a shield behind which the area can unite and deal with the Russians without being intimidated. G.I.s serve the purpose of providing a forward defense against an accidental or conventional attack. In case of all-out war, their presence in substantial numbers is a guarantee to West Europeans and a warning to the Soviets that the U.S. would protect its allies with its nuclear might.

Despite the importance of the American role, the Western Europeans currently are experiencing a salutary surge of independence, combined with deep disenchantment with the U.S. For its part, Washington has lost its vision of what sort of Europe it would like. Despite President Nixon's several European trips, he has failed to put into effect a comprehensive European policy. In part, that is only due to a realistic recognition of the limits of U.S. influence. Kissinger, recalling early U.S. failures at trying to get Britain into the Common Market and create a joint defense system, is convinced that the U.S. is powerless to influence Europe in any way except by keeping its troops there at substantial levels.

It will clearly take stronger presidential leadership to curb a growing feeling in the U.S. that Europe is fat and prosperous enough to protect itself. In the view of all Western European leaders, a swift, major, unilateral U.S. troop cutback—anything under the present 185,000 G.I.s in West Germany is often cited as the peril point—would be immensely damaging. Several Eastern European statesmen privately agree; they point out that the Russians would be far harder to cope with in the absence of U.S. forces on the Continent. "On the road toward a more stable system of security," Brandt told TIME, "the necessity for a full American engagement in European affairs will not decrease but will even increase. When I say engagement, I'm not speaking in the sense of Fliegenbeine—flies' legs, or the exact number of soldiers' legs. I'm speaking about political engagement."

Brandt's attempt to pursue Western European unity simultaneously with Eastern European rapprochement will require astute diplomacy. By personality, background and experience, however, he is uniquely equipped to deal with both East and West. According to Klaus Harpprecht, editor of the intellectual monthly Monat and a close friend, Brandt possesses "an Anglo-Saxon sense of fairness, a respect for