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Brandt rejects accusations that he has given concessions without gaining anything in return. "We are losing nothing with this treaty that has not been gambled away long ago," he told West Germans in a television address from Moscow at the signing in August. As a longtime student of Communism, Brandt argues that both Moscow and Warsaw have, in fact, given up a very great deal in signing renunciation-of-force agreements with West Germany. By so doing, the Communists tacitly acknowledged that Bonn is a peaceful partner. For a quarter of a century, the Communists had been blaming the "revenge-seeking" West Germans for everything from crop failures to high military expenditures. Warsaw Pact soldiers sent into Czechoslovakia in 1968 were told, for example, that they were "marching to save our comrades from subversion and invasion by the fascist West Germans."
Accordingly, Brandt told Gate, "the Russians have had to pay a price that for them is rather high. They have had, more or less, to take out of play the anti-German card. Up until now, the anti-German card was always the one they could play in situations where it was difficult for the East bloc countries to agree on something."
FEARS OF FINLANDIZATION. Brandt concedes that a secure flank in Western Europe would allow Moscow to concentrate on its tense, 4,000-mile frontier with China. He is also aware that the Soviets have not discarded their longtime goal of dislodging the U.S. from Europe, driving a wedge between Washington and its West European allies and supplanting the postwar Pax Americana with a Pax Sovietica. The Soviets have insistently called for a conference on European security that would include all European countries, the U.S. and Canada. Some Western experts suspect that Moscow's purpose is only to have the European status quo formally recognized and create the illusion of peace. That would increase pressure on the U.S. to get out of Western Europe and dismantle NATO.
Brandt has nevertheless supported the Soviet call for the conference, as have several other nations and most of the Continent's neutrals. But Brandt acknowledges the great danger of Western Europe's possible "Finlandization" —meaning that without a U.S. military presence, Soviet influence could become so strong that Moscow might dominate Western Europe as it overshadows Finland, without an actual takeover. Therefore Brandt insists that, as part of the negotiations, the Soviets must agree to discuss "mutually balanced force reductions," so that any U.S. withdrawals from Western Europe would be matched by Soviet pullbacks from Eastern Europe. Before Poland erupted, some officials in the West were hopeful that balanced withdrawals could begin within two or three years. That estimate is probably too optimistic now. Brandt also insists that the security conference cannot be held unless the Russians, in addition to making an accommodation on Berlin, show forward movement at the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).
GREATER LEVERAGE. In linking his negotiations to other issues that are beyond his control, Brandt has taken a definite risk. It can be argued that if West Germany fails to ratify the Treaty of Moscow, the situation will be worse than before. There is no