Disarming Threat to Stability

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alliance doctrine, they served to persuade more and more Europeans to view the U.S. as a menace to their survival, and, conversely, to give the benefit of the doubt to the Soviet Union's well-calculated rhetoric of peace. Joseph Luns, NATO's outspoken Secretary-General, noted the ultimate irony: "There is a greater fear of the weapons NATO is to deploy than of the weapons the U.S.S.R. has already deployed." Alarmed by the antimissile movement's challenge to the Western alliance, France's President François Mitterrand, a firm believer in U.S. defense policies, said during his visit to the U.S. last month: "As soon as possible, the U.S. should take the initiative, catch the ball while it is in the air. If it does not seize this opportunity, European countries will feel compelled to speak up and could be pushed deeper into the psychological and moral crisis we see them in today."

In his speech last week (see NATION), President Reagan moved to seize the opportunity. In.offering to drop plans to deploy U.S. intermediate-range missiles if the Soviets dismantle theirs, he tried, belatedly and for the first time, to allay Europe's roiling fears. He also sought to undercut Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev, who had skillfully exploited America's essential and long-held views on nuclear strategy to portray the Soviet Union as the only superpower devoted to the search for peace (see ESSAY). While Reagan's proposal was hailed by Europe's leaders, the reaction of the peace groups was ambivalent. They took credit for forcing the President to act, but claimed he had not gone far enough, and made it clear that they would continue their campaign. eagan displayed an actor's exquisite sense of timing as he finally decided to step out on the foreign policy stage. Last weekend Brezhnev was due in Bonn for a four-day visit with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who, of all the NATO leaders, has most directly staked his future on the missile issue. West Germany, on NATO'S front line, is crucial to the deployment of the new U.S. weapons.

The Europeans who initially urged the U.S. to develop and deploy the new missiles reasoned that they would offset the growing arsenal of intermediate-range Soviet SS-20s while giving the U.S. bargaining strength in any future arms negotiations. Beginning in 1977, Schmidt led the campaign for the Europeans. In so doing, he was trying to ensure that the U.S. would remain faithful to its pledge, made when the alliance was formed in 1949, to defend NATO's European members (see box).

Schmidt insisted that at least one other continental NATO member accept a share of the 108 Pershing IIs and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles that the U.S. proposed to install. He demanded from the U.S. a commitment to new arms negotiations with the Soviet Union, designed to reduce the number of nuclear weapons within Europe. Once the U.S. agreed to this so-called two-track decision, Italy decided to take 112 cruises and Britain 160. Belgium and The Netherlands assented, but only tentatively, to take 48 each. In both countries, weak governments tried to placate domestic opposition by linking a final decision to progress in arms control.

The West German Chancellor's endorsement of the 1979 NATO decision has been challenged by the strong, vocal left wing of his own Social Democratic Party. Last month 58