Disarming Threat to Stability

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exception of France, no Western European country has shown the willingness to spend what it takes to develop a credible military force. "The Europeans made a conscious decision not to emphasize conventional arms buildups way back in the 1950s," says a U.S. diplomat. "They opted for the American nuclear umbrella instead. If they want that umbrella to be folded up, they presumably know the consequences and accept them. We can't graft backbone."

If Europe's defenses are weakened, the Soviet Union would not automatically make any military move. It might not have to. Says a top NATO analyst: "There need not be a Soviet invasion. The Soviets simply won't take Europe seriously. They will use it as a supply depot for technology."

The diplomats' term for this fate is "Finlandization," a reference to the policy of accommodation with Moscow that Finland, which shares a 788-mile border with the U.S.S.R., has perforce adopted since the end of World War II (see following story). In essence, Europe would check with the giant looming over its

Eastern shoulder before making major political or economic decisions. As one French businessman puts it: "The Soviet Ambassador would be the most powerful man in Paris—and in every other European capital."

To those who argue that such accommodation is preferable to nuclear annihilation, Lord Carrington offers the solid answer: "This is highly misleading, because there is in fact a third alternative. It is the one that Western Europe has pursued successfully for half a lifetime: to prevent war and remain free."

Though the major NATO governments oppose the antimissile movement, they are not blameless. "We believe the Europeans are too timid in dealing with paci fist sentiment," says a Pentagon official. "They see no political rewards for themselves in speaking out on nuclear weapons policy and tend to back away from the debate. These governments have to do it for themselves." Says Christoph Bertram, director of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies: "There are a lot of people in West Germany today who would accept a reasonable explanation of why the government believes [defense] is so important. The people are confused and frightened, and the current level of debate makes it worse."

Declares NATO Secretary-General Luns: "It is high time to shake their complacency, and I recommend doing so rather rudely.

They must be told that freedom's blessing demands a price. They must be told that no matter how large that price might be, it is nothing compared to the price that would have to be paid to regain those blessings should they ever be lost." Indeed, although the U.S. and Europe are interdependent, Europe needs the U.S. militarily more than the U.S. needs Europe. Fortress America is an unattractive thought, but at least thinkable. Fortress Europe is unthinkable.

But if European public opinion needs a clearer explanation of why, 36 years after the end of World War II, its defense is still linked to U.S. nuclear power, Americans need to be reminded that there is no alternative to their special relationship with Europe. It is understandable that if the Continent decided to disarm, some might think the U.S. would do well to abandon Europe, along with the pride and