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At week's end Reagan finally bowed to congressional realities. He announced that he was willing to delay indefinitely any final decision on how to deploy the MX. Meanwhile, he argued, the Senate should approve production funds for the MX, and the House should reconsider its rejection of those funds so that no time is lost in the missile's possible deployment. Said he: "I welcome a vigorous debate on the best way to base the missile."
The Dense Pack fiasco astonished congressional observers. The big question: How could anyone high in the White House have expected to conceal such a significant split among the Joint Chiefs from key defense legislators, who are often social as well as professional associates of the top generals?
Dense Pack was, in fact, mainly a creation of National Security Council Consultant Thomas Reed, a former Secretary of the Air Force, and National Security Adviser William Clark, who has no military expertise. Under a Dec. 1 deadline to come up with a basing system, the President rushed to oversell a plan whose flaws probably foredoomed it. That was pushing even Reagan's prowess as a communicator much too far.
—By Ed Magnuson. Reported by Neil MacNeil/Washington