(3 of 4)
The President's men insisted that the issue was not Dense Pack but "modernization" of the land leg of the nation's nuclear triad. At the least, they argued, MX production should proceed as a bargaining chip in the START talks. But even Alabama Republican Jack Edwards, who directed pro-MX forces, conceded that the missile "is too expensive to use simply as a chip." The strongest argument for Reagan's position was offered by Michel, who sought to sow doubts about the ability of Congressmen to assess such technical matters. "In every age there are always well-meaning patriotic people who say we can defend freedom and peace just as well if we cut this or that weapons system," he said. Then he paused and asked, "But suppose they are wrong?"
In the end, it was a mere one-minute speech that had the greatest impact. Florida Democrat Charles Bennett, 72, a remarkably diligent legislator (he has not missed one of the 9,406 roll calls in the House since June 1951) with a reputation as a champion of defense spending, rose as the second-ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee. Said Bennett: "There is too much money at stake to spend it on such an incredible type of defense as Dense Pack. I believe it will be useless by the time it is in place."
The roll call was anticlimactic. The packed galleries rang with cheers when Speaker Tip O'Neill announced the results: 245 to 176 in favor of deleting the $988 million for MX production. Fifty Republicans had opposed Reagan. Only 38 Democrats had taken his side.
The next day, however, the House promptly rebuffed any interpretation that it was opposed to the general thrust of the President's record arms buildup. It shouted down attempts to eliminate $3.9 billion for production of the B-1 strategic bomber and $3.5 billion for one of two new nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. It passed the $231 billion defense appropriations bill for fiscal 1983, $48 billion more than this year's military outlays, but $18 billion less than Reagan wanted.
As the MX production battle moved to the Senate, Weinberger and Joint Chiefs Chairman John W Vessey Jr. ran into a cold reception from the Senate Armed Services Committee. Most of the Senators reaffirmed their support of the MX but badgered the Pentagon witnesses about all of the zigzags on basing the missile. Scolded Washington Democrat Henry Jackson: "The public's got the idea that this is a boondoggle, a Rube Goldberg." Georgia Democrat Sam Nunn, one of the Senate's most influential defense experts, warned: "I don't think you realize the trouble the MX basing model is in now."
Then Nunn drew a remarkable admission from General Vessey. He asked whether the Joint Chiefs all supported Dense Pack. With a rueful half-smile, Vessey conceded that three of the five did not. That confirmed the rumor circulating in the House. Vessey, an Army general, later clearly implied that only he and Air Force Chief of Staff Charles A. Gabriel had favored going ahead with Dense Pack. Opposed to Dense Pack until there is greater technical evidence of its ability to survive a Soviet first strike were Army Chief of Staff Edward C. Meyer, Chief of Naval Operations James D. Watkins and Marine Commandant Robert H. Barrow.