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The Shah had apparently been more concerned by the talk of extradition than the Carter Administration realized. Panamanian officials told him privately that they would never send him back to Tehran, but also said publicly they would carefully consider the request for extradition. Referring to the dealings between Panama and Iran, one Administration official remarked: "Some theater was being played." Such backstage maneuvering could have troubled the Shah.
In Egypt, Sadat did not stint on the royal welcome. He escorted the Shah to the hospital, where a suite of ten rooms overlooking the Nile had been reserved. Later he proclaimed magnanimously that the Shah would take up permanent residence in Egypt. No foreign or internal pressures would dissuade him, said Sadat, from showing "Islamic compassion." Continued Sadat: "What Khomeini preaches is not true Islam, for our religion does not speak of vengeance or hatred." A day later, Sadat announced that the Shah had agreed to the offer of permanent asylum. "And believe me," Sadat added with a smile, "if he had not accepted it, I would have forced it on him."
Sadat reminded his people of Egypt's duty to aid a man who had once come to Egypt's aid. Speaking to a group of polytechnic graduates, Sadat recalled how at the close of the October War of 1973 it had been the Shah who had answered Egypt's emergency appeal for oil and followed this up with $1 billion in aid.
Sadat seemed unconcerned that his offer of a haven to the Shah might produce painful repercussions. At least for the moment, the reaction was relatively subdued, with only scattered incidents of protest. As for the rest of the Muslim world, Sadat assumed he had little left to lose. Diplomatic relations with Iran were broken off last May, and after the Camp David accords, every Arab country except Oman withdrew its ambassador from Cairo. In addition, Egypt now not only is self-sufficient in oil production but earns $1 billion from its oil exports.
Most Western authorities were ready to accept the view that Sadat's principal motive was his desire to show his loyalty to an old ally and his adherence to the Islamic codes of honor and dignity. As a British diplomat puts it, "by welcoming the ailing Shah, Sadat is showing the civilized world that there is another face of Islam, honorable and compassionate."
In the Middle East there was more skepticism. Said Syrian Diplomat Adib Daoudy: "Sadat wants to portray himself as a man to be trusted, a man who can stand alone against all the odds." Israelis suspected that Sadat was putting the U.S. in his debt at a convenient moment.
Sadat unquestionably has been frustrated and exasperated by Israeli intransigence in the autonomy talks and its determination to press ahead with new settlements in the occupied West Bank.
He was also keenly disappointed by the Carter Administration's flip-flop in the United Nations, where the U.S. first supported a resolution calling on Israel to dismantle its settlements in the occupied territories, then disavowed its vote. Later a discouraged Sadat sent Carter a message saying that Carter should act urgently to save the peace process from total stagnation. Following this, Carter invited Sadat and Begin to Washington for separate meetings beginning next week.