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The crisis took another confusing twist at week's end when the Iranian state radio network broadcast what it described as a letter from President Carter to Khomeini acknowledging past "mistakes" in U.S. policy. The President was quoted as having said: "My Government has inherited a very sensitive international situation which is the result of policy and other conditions, which made us all make mistakes in the past." White House Press Secretary Jody Powell at first categorically denied that any such message had been sent. On Sunday, however, Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh reaffirmed in a televised interview that a "constructive" message from Carter had indeed been received, though he explained that it was not a written document but apparently an oral message transmitted to him and President Banisadr by a Swiss diplomat. At that point, White House officials confirmed that a message had been passed through the Swiss some five days before, pressing for speedy action on the hostage crisis. But they continued to deny that there had been any communication addressed to Khomeini personally. It seemed likely that the confusion over the message emanating from the White House would add further fuel to the primary-campaign controversy about Carter's handling of foreign affairs.
The Carter Administration was correct in assuming that many Iranians would see the Shah's flight to Egypt as an American machination. The truth, however, was quite the opposite: the U.S. tried hard to talk the Shah into staying in Panama. It was no coincidence that the Shah left only a few hours before extradition papers were scheduled to be filed in Panama by lawyers for the Iranian government. U.S. officials had repeatedly assured him that Panama would never grant extradition. But, suspicious of American promises, the Shah had contacted Sadat a few days earlier to find out whether the Egyptian President's offer of refuge still stood. Sadat immediately repeated the invitation he had extended last year. Even at that time, the U.S. had felt that his presence in Egypt could be politically upsetting to Sadat, and the Shah had agreed. But this time, fed up with Panama, the Shah was eager to go.
In an effort to forestall the move, President Carter sent White House Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan to Panama. At that point it was still assumed that the main problem was to make sure the Shah received proper medical care. Panamanian authorities assured Jordan that they would do whatever they could and would allow the Shah to remain as long as he liked. The Shah refused to see Jordan and asked to see Presidential Counsel Lloyd Cutler, whom he had liked and trusted when Cutler helped arrange his move from Texas to Panama last December.
During his meeting with the Shah last week, Cutler explained why the U.S. felt a move to Egypt was unwise, detailing the adverse effects it might have not only on the hostages and on Sadat but on the whole Middle East peace process. The Shah dismissed the arguments and, at a second meeting the next morning, confirmed that he was going to Cairo. As one U.S. official described it later, "He put his own interests first." The President's National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, said the Shah had been given the choice of coming to the U.S. for treatment, but it is doubtful that a serious invitation was officially offered.