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Meanwhile, SALT II—despite Reagan's denunciation of it and the Senate's refusal to ratify it—is still being observed informally by both sides. It imposes some limitations on the same Soviet weapons that START would reduce drastically. Given Reagan's avowed goal of achieving reductions, it is ironic that the only part of the SALT II treaty that the Soviets are not living up to is a provision that would, if the agreement were formally in force, require them to reduce 450 of their older strategic weapons. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, who have supported the treaty, worry that if informal observance breaks down, the Soviets will be in a position to add to their ICBM forces much more quickly than the U.S. can take countermeasures.
Reagan intends START as a substitute for, and improvement on, SALT. But he is taking a big chance: if START proves to be a nonstarter, the U.S. may wind up without either the benefits envisaged by Reagan's bold proposal or SALT'S more modest achievements.
—By Strobe Talbott. Reported by Laurence I. Barrett/Peoria, Ill.