(2 of 3)
Thus, under Reagan's initiative, both superpowers' arsenals of nuclear missiles would be reduced dramatically, and to equal levels. But the cuts would be deepest in those categories of weapons where the Soviet Union has, over the decades, concentrated its own strength—particularly large intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). The U.S. has fewer and smaller ICBMS, with fewer and less destructive land-based MIRVs. On the other hand, it has a more diversified deterrent, with more of its nuclear firepower aboard bombers and submarines.
Under Reagan's ceilings, the U.S. would have to make considerably less of an adjustment in its strategic forces than would the Soviet Union. That feature of the proposal will almost certainly prompt the Soviets to charge that it is unfair and one-sided. No doubt some American arms-control advocates will agree, accusing the Administration of making the Kremlin an offer it cannot possibly accept—a deceptively equal-looking, deliberately nonnegotiable proposal that is part of what some suspect is the hardliners' secret agenda of sabotaging disarmament so that the U.S. can get on with the business of rearmament.
Administration officials deny that accusation. They contend that the Soviets have proliferated land-based warheads beyond any level justified by the legitimate needs of self-defense. Those warheads are now so numerous, so powerful and so accurate that they raise the specter of a pre-emptive strike against the U.S. The Soviets' monstrous ICBMs have given them a nearly 3-to-l advantage over the U.S. in "throw weight"—the cumulative power to "throw" megatons of death and destruction at the other nation. That excessive throw weight on the Soviet side of the scales has upset the strategic balance. Therefore the onus is on the U.S.S.R. to make deeper cuts. In fact, in his Eureka speech, Reagan said he wants eventually to reduce both sides' missile throw weight to "less than current American levels."
Coupled with its $1.6 trillion, five-year defense budget and its plan to push ahead with the MX, cruise missiles, the Trident II submarine program, the B-l and Stealth bombers, the Reagan START proposal in effect offers the Soviets a choice: accept a bilateral deal requiring a cutback on the weapons that may have made the U.S. vulnerable to a first strike, or the U.S. will redress the balance unilaterally by deploying an array of new weapons. In other words, make sacrifices now or face a greatly increased American threat later.
Whether the Reagan proposal can be the basis of serious negotiation depends largely on three factors: 1) whether the Soviet leadership, in the midst of its transition to the post-Brezhnev era, can absorb what may initially come as a shock, then respond with a constructive counterproposal; 2) whether the Reagan Administration is prepared to make substantial compromises in the negotiations for an eventual agreement; and 3) whether the Congress will continue to support the Administration's extremely expensive defense plans, which constitute the "or-else" inducement for the Soviets to bargain.