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As bad as the shock was to the U.S., the Administration made it worse. It reacted in a schizophrenic mood, alternating between recrimination and caution. Behind the scenes, factions were vying to shape President Ford's public position. Officials close to Henry Kissinger felt that the Secretary of State's historic reputation was at stake and urged Ford to defend the Nixon-Kissinger Viet Nam policy that had produced the 1973 Paris accords, for which Kissinger won a Nobel Peace Prize. They wanted the major blame pinned on Congress for its alleged failure to live up to those accords by cutting back aid to Saigon. Others knew that the facts were not so simple. At any rate, Ford's closest White House advisers, including Counsellor Robert Hartmann, felt that nothing could be gained by dwelling on past mistakes or misguided policy, and they pleaded for a forward-looking presidential leadership that would stress the need for national unity.
Ford's indecision soon became apparent. He sympathized with the advice that seeking scapegoats would undermine his desire to rebuild a national consensus on foreign policy. He has bridled at the common belief that his Secretary of State runs U.S. foreign policy, and he has been concerned about Kissinger's often pessimistic moods and ample ego.
On the other hand, he is philosophically attuned to the Kissinger claim that the worldwide credibility of the U.S. was vitally at stake in Viet Nam.
At first, Ford literally dodged comment. In a bizarre scene, after he arrived in California for a Palm Springs golfing vacation, he laughingly ran away from reporters seeking to question him about Viet Nam. "Oh, ho, ho," he replied to the first question, as a panting press contingent chased after him. Later, in a speech to San Diego business and civic leaders, he termed the events in South Viet Nam "tragic," and called for "a new sense of national unity in these sad and troubled times." No one, Ford insisted, should "engage in recriminations or attempts to assess blame."
During a televised press conference, Ford avoided placing blame except on North Viet Nam, for violating the Paris accords, and on President Thieu, for his "unilateral decision" to abandon the northern provinces without first consulting or informing the U.S. But before the conference was over, and even while saying that he would not point an accusing finger, he clearly implied that the Democratic-controlled Congress was a major force behind the South Vietnamese collapse. Ford said he felt "frustrated by the action of Congress" in failing to approve the full amounts that he had requested for aid to South Viet Nam. Asked bluntly whether he thought the loss of 56,000 American lives in Viet Nam had been in vain, Ford suggested indirectly that it had. This would not have been true, he said, if the U.S. had "carried out the solemn commitments that were made in Paris at the time American fighting was stopped."
The President also reaffirmed his belief in the domino theory of nations falling to Communism, and needlessly insisted that the Viet Nam policies of Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and himself had all been "aimed in the right direction" and constituted "sound policy."