This was not the way a war should end. At least it was not the way in which many Americans had hoped it would end—by somehow fading away. As South Viet Nam verged on collapse, the scenes of chaos inflamed anew America's frustration and horror over its most tragic foreign experience.
Even as President Ford pleaded for more military aid to South Viet Nam, Saigon's troops fled from the north in a frenzy, abandoning an estimated $700 million worth of military equipment. Said a Pentagon officer: "We might just as well send the stuff directly to Hanoi—then it wouldn't get damaged." The U.S. was appalled by the brutal way in which South Vietnamese marines, many trained by the U.S., stormed an American evacuation ship leaving Danang, looting, raping and killing refugees in a wild scramble to escape. Many Americans became preoccupied with helping refugees, especially children, though even here catastrophe seemed inescapable: a plane carrying South Vietnamese orphans crashed after takeoff from Saigon.
Practically speaking, South Viet Nam was lost. "It's really too late to do anything about it," declared Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, one of the few Washington officials to say publicly what others were conceding privately. "I guess a lot of Vietnamese are going to die." Somewhat bitterly, he added, "For us, we go on living." Later, Rockefeller insisted that his "too late" view applied only to the fate of the refugees. Yet, while the Saigon government might shake up its personnel, and perhaps even rally some effective defense of the city and the Mekong Delta, its long-range military fate appeared sealed. The Communists, now superior in both firepower and manpower, could take their time in striking the final blows.
At the Pentagon, some senior officers compared the South Vietnamese rout with other military disasters: Napoleon's debacle in Moscow in 1812, the fall of France in 1940, the Chinese Nationalist collapse in 1949. Yet the troops of President Nguyen Van Thieu were not retreating in the face of a massive Communist offensive; most were not in contact with the enemy at all. South Viet Nam's army had always performed unevenly, yet at its best it had given a good account of itself after so long and terrible a war. But now a full six South Vietnamese divisions had simply dissolved in a cascade of fright after Thieu abruptly ordered a massive retreat without giving his commanders a chance to lay the complex plans necessary to keep such a risky military maneuver from turning into a rout.