Special Section: WHITE HOUSE YEARS: PART 2 THE AGONY OF VIETNAM

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autumn air in the garden, whispering softly (in case the bushes were bugged). Then, to pass the time, I thought of taking a drive. After ten minutes, restless and wanting to confer more privately with Haig, I asked the driver to stop the car at a place where Haig and I could walk. He pulled over at a spot where the trees lining the road suddenly opened up to reveal a small lake. Picnickers were spreading out their food on checkered tablecloths; couples were lying under the trees. The sky had the mellow blue of the early French autumn. And none of these Parisians paid the slightest attention to this odd group of self-absorbed Americans who were walking along the narrow footpaths lined by tall grass.

For us the contrast between the matter-of-fact peacefulness of the scene and our own anxiety was almost beyond bearing. At 4 p.m. we would know whether the agony endured by so many for nearly a decade would have purchased an honorable end to the war in Viet Nam.

The meeting resumed on schedule. Le Duc Tho did not beat around the bush. "In order to show our good will and to ensure a rapid end to the war, rapid restoration of peace in Viet Nam, as all of us wish for, today we put forward a new proposal, a very realistic and very simple proposal," he said.

Le Duc Tho suggested that the U.S. and North Viet Nam sign an agreement settling the military questions between them—withdrawal, prisoners, ceasefire. The political problem—"that is the most thorny, the most difficult problem"—would not be allowed to prolong our negotiations. Le Duc Tho now dispensed with the entire concept of a coalition government. It was now only an "Administration of National Concord," to be set up within three months by the two South Vietnamese parties and charged with implementing the signed agreements and "organizing" elections.

This pale shadow of their former demands for a coalition government was not much to show for a decade of heroic exertion and horrendous suffering by the North Vietnamese. After four years of implacable insistence that we dismantle the political structure of our ally and replace it with a coalition government, Hanoi had now essentially given up its political demands.

And there were other provisions that also helped meet our concerns. For three years Hanoi had insisted on an end of American military aid to South Viet Nam. Le Duc Tho now scrapped this proposal; we could continue to supply South Viet Nam. Hanoi accepted our proposal of May 31, 1971, that infiltration into South Viet Nam cease; if observed, this would guarantee the erosion of North Vietnamese strength in the South.

At once I and most of my colleagues understood the significance of what we had heard. In the immediate recess I asked for, my aide, Winston Lord, and I shook hands and said to each other: "We have done it." Haig, who had served in Viet Nam, declared with emotion that we had saved the honor of the military men who had served, died and suffered there.

I have often been asked for my most thrilling moment in public service. I have participated in many spectacular events. But the moment that moved me most deeply has to be that cool, autumn, Sunday afternoon while the shadows were falling over the serene French landscape and that large quiet room, hung with abstract paintings, was illuminated only at the green