(12 of 23)
The meeting completed my transition from the academic world to the world of affairs. These were men who had been my friends, academicians whose lifetime of study should have encouraged a sense of perspective. That they disagreed with our decision was understandable; I had myself gone through a long process of hesitation before I became convinced that there was no alternative. But the lack of compassion, the overweening righteousness, the refusal to offer an alternative reinforced two convictions: that for the internal peace of our country, the war had to be ended, but also that in doing so on terms compatible with any international responsibility, we would get no help from those with whom I had spent my professional life.
Hanoi's Spring Offensive
After Cambodia, the remainder of 1970 and 1971 brought inconclusive military operations and equally inconclusive diplomatic negotiations. The U.S. made repeated efforts to find what Kissinger terms "an honorable compromise. " On Oct. 7, 1970, Nixon offered a standstill cease-fire and a total bombing halt. In May 1971 Kissinger offered a cease-fire and unilateral withdrawal provided Hanoi ended its infiltration. Le Duc Tho refused to budge from his demand that the U.S. overthrow the Saigon government, by rigging the scheduled presidential elections or even by murder. "Le Duc Tho was eager to be helpful," Kissinger writes. During one session, "he took me aside and suggested that if we did not know how to replace [South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van] Thieu by means of the presidential election, assassination would do admirably. The vehemence of my refusal produced one of the few occasions when I saw Le Duc Tho temporarily flustered. He obviously had trouble understanding what I was getting so excited about. " In 1972, however, the immediate concern was with Hanoi's military moves.
On March 30, 1972, four weeks after the President returned from his historic visit to China, the long awaited offensive in Viet Nam finally broke over us. The pretense that the Viet Nam conflict was a "people's war," a guerrilla uprising in the South, was over; this was an invasion by the North Vietnamese regular army in division strength.
I was convinced that this was Hanoi's last throw of the dice. On April 3 I told the President that the attack would now precipitate matters; we would get no awards for losing with moderation. If we defeated the offensive, we would get a settlement. The North Vietnamese had thrown everything into their effort; if it failed, they would have no choice except to negotiate.
Against intense bureaucratic opposition, Nixon ordered repeated augmentations of our air and naval forces in Southeast Asia. On April 9 Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin complained that our buildup was growing ominous. "Anatol," I replied, "we have been warning you for months that if there were an offensive we would take drastic measures to end the war once and for all. That situation has now arisen." He did not bristle. The Soviets rarely bully when they believe the opponent to be strong and