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The Administration proposal to sell jet aircraft to the Arabs (as well as to Israel) is a perfect illustration of the degree to which a Middle East peace settlement is in the long-term interests of the U.S. The congressional forces opposing the sale TAR of planes to Saudi Arabia and Egypt have been strengthened by the latest hostilities in the Middle East, and may manage to veto the deal. At the same time, the U.S. is negotiating with the Saudis to expand their petroleum production in the light of the increased fuel needs expected in the 1980s. But such an expansion would require an expenditure of up to $6 billion, and the Saudis are reluctant to make it unless they receive from the U.S. a demonstration of good faith—namely, the sale of the F-15s. If the U.S. withholds the planes, the Saudis are not likely to expand their production capacity, and the U.S. and its allies could run into critical energy shortages by the mid-1980s.
Of most immediate significance, however, is the effect of the recent violence on the Sadat peace initiative.
The pressures on the Egyptian President have seriously increased, even as the chances have diminished that he will be able to fulfill his role as catalyst for a comprehensive settlement embracing all the Arab nations that remain in a state of war with Israel. Some observers are convinced, however, that the P.L.O. raid and the Israeli reprisal are part of an inevitable chain of events that is pulling Sadat toward making a separate peace with Israel.
Reports TIME Cairo Bureau Chief Wilton Wynn: "It is true that as of now no Egyptian official will admit that a separate peace is a possibility. Even the most moderate, like Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Butros Ghali or pro-American Editor Mustafa Amin, maintain that a peace without the other Arabs is impossible. Sadat himself insists that he must have a comprehensive settlement, not an Israeli-Egyptian accord. But the gap between Sadat and the P.L.O. has widened almost to the point that it can never be bridged again, and the Egyptian President ultimately may have to make a choice between the P.L.O. and peace. Given his almost mystical commitment to the peace process and his bitterness toward the P.L.O., his choice almost certainly would be for peace.
"A separate peace is still a long way off, but such an accord would have to be camouflaged so that it would appear to be part of a comprehensive settlement. Until now, the Egyptians have retained the hope that the peace process can be salvaged, that Israel and Egypt may yet agree to a declaration of principles and invite some other Arabs—such as Jordan's King Hussein and some of the moderate Palestinians—to join the talks. But the raid along the Haifa-Tel Aviv highway indicates that in the last analysis the P.L.O. will throw its weight on the side of blocking negotiations rather than supporting them. If Sadat wants peace, and he wants it desperately, he may have to go it alone."
Such a solution would fulfill the wildest dreams of Menachem Begin, but the