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But the promise of cultural exchanges (beginning with permission to let TIME'S Jerrold Schecter and Syndicated Columnist Joseph Kraft stay on for a while longer in China), trade and diplomatic contact created a mechanism that could produce further and future agreements. And there is always the possibility that there is more to the talks in China than meets the eye in this communiqué. A beaming Kissinger insisted that the U.S. was very pleased: "It exceeded our expectations." That may well be so, but expectations tend to be in the eye of the beholder, and for some, the Shanghai communiqué will be too little—and for others, too much.
In the U.S., the President jeopardized his standing with part of his own constituency. Conservatives complained that he seemed to have gone too far without a promise of getting much in return. By making such a show of praising his hosts, he cast himself in the role of a suppliant. By appearing to be granted an interview with Mao Tse-tung rather than getting one as a matter of course, he seemed to accept a status lesser than that of the chairman.
In the usual pre-summit euphoria, some commentators had been too prone to overlook the obvious brutality, regimentation and instability of the Chinese regime. The reality of China was a sobering counterbalance for the newsmen on the tour (see THE PRESS). Spontaneity, they often discovered, was carefully rehearsed. Example: when the President visited the Ming tombs, smiling, colorfully dressed Chinese frolicked in the vicinity. Sure enough, as soon as the visit ended, functionaries collected the transistor radios that people were listening to. little girls removed the bright ribbons from their hair and the whole Potemkin-village scene vanished in a twinkling.
Camaraderie. Still, in their brief time in Peking, Americans received a startling lesson in social cooperation. To a man (and woman), they were stunned at the sight of some 200,000 Chinese pouring onto the streets to remove the snow that had fallen during the visit. A compulsory exercise? To be sure, citizens who neglected their ditties would be severely chastised. But the visitors detected a civic spirit and camaraderie that are spectacularly lacking in the present-day U.S. In the long run, one of the most important questions about the U.S. and China will be just how much the two countries may learn from each other.
For the nearer future, though, the President's trip must be judged in terms of world politics. In the U.S., it almost certainly formalized the end of anti-Communism as a dominant foreign policy—and it was fitting that Richard Nixon should help end that era as dramatically as he once helped start it. The trip also marked the beginning of a more pragmatic and complex, less concentrated and crusading application of American power. It officially inaugurated the already much advertised multipolar world of five power centers, with Peking more or less officially proclaimed No. 5 —though in the communiqué China disavowed superpower status. The components of this pentagram are far from equal. How the President's voyage will really affect the relationships within that new field of force—who stands to gain or to lose—is something that neither Nixon, Mao nor Chou can know at this point.