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Even as both countries acknowledged the "differences in their social systems," they found agreement on four broad areas. They would "progress toward the normalization of relations." They would try to rescue the world from the danger of international war. Neither would seek hegemony in Asia or permit any other country to try to extend its power in the area. They agreed not to "negotiate on behalf of any third party" or to assist each other in any operation directed against another nation.
The steps that the two countries proposed to take to "normalize relations" turned out to be small but potentially significant ones. They would encourage an exchange of scientists, artists, journalists and sportsmen; they would increase bilateral trade. Though formal ties would not be established, diplomatic contact, in a form yet to be worked out, would be frequent.
The Jargon. The text of the communique will doubtless be endlessly dissected in the days and weeks to come. Inevitably, and perhaps unjustly, strenuous efforts will be made to score it like a Ping Pong match, in a determined attempt to assert who came out ahead. Some will find the U.S. acceptance of the jargon of the Bandung Conference on peaceful coexistence distasteful. On the other hand. China assented to the proposition that "seeking hegemony in the Asian-Pacific region" is conduct unbecoming a well-behaved neighbor, a precept several of its neighbors would dearly love to see put into practice. As Henry Kissinger pointed out later, such talk about hegemony in a joint communique with China would have seemed very unlikely just six months ago.
On what China calls the "crucial question"—the status of Taiwan—the U.S. made what seemed the major news and concession: the assertion of an eventual goal of complete military withdrawal from the island. That had never been so bluntly stated, and was sure to cause fresh tremors on already edgy Taiwan and elsewhere in Asia. But in fact such a pullback from an essentially untenable position has always been implicit in Nixon's Guam Doctrine, and in the Administration's view, reiterated in the communique, that the problem of Taiwan is ultimately one for the Chinese to settle peacefully among themselves.
Yet in diplomacy, context means a lot, even when stating the obvious. On the face of it, the U.S. got nothing very obvious in return. On all the hard questions, the gaps loomed as wide as ever. There seemed no promise of any aid in settling the Viet Nam War. (Not that there had been much expectation for such help; moreover, if it were to occur, it would scarcely be mentioned in the communiqué.) There was no call for an Asian peace conference, as some had hoped. There appeared no agreement on Japan's expanding role as an Asian power. There was no give on the problem of divided Korea. What was said about the threat of the Soviet Union, which after all was the principal impetus for getting together in the first place, only the participants know as yet. The communiqué deplored any effort by countries to gang up on one another, and Kissinger took pains in his press conference to assert that the new U.S. relationship with China "is not directed against the Soviet Union" —an assertion that Moscow may just not believe, and with some reason.