INTELLIGENCE: The CIA: Time to Come In From the Cold

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necessary." Ransom would permit covert actions only when U.S. security is clearly in jeopardy. William T.R. Fox, professor of international relations at Columbia University, would additionally permit them "to undo the spread of Hitler and other like governments." Dean Harvey Picker of Columbia's School of International Affairs would allow clandestine operations to prevent nuclear war. As Senator Church points out, however, the "national security considerations must be compelling" for covert action to be justified. For his part, Colby declines to say under what precise circumstances he would favor covert action.

Many critics who concede the need for covert action in some cases nevertheless propose two other reforms: 1) separating intelligence gathering from covert operations and 2) tighter control.

Most experts doubt that "dirty tricks" can be separated from intelligence gathering. Explains Richard Bissell, onetime head of CIA covert operations: "The gathering of information inevitably edges over into more active functions, simply because the process of making covert contacts with high-ranking officials of other nations gives the U.S. influence in them." To eliminate that problem, the U.S. could run two separate agencies. Bissell claims that this idea was found to be impractical by both Britain and Germany in World War II because agents kept "running into each other."

The case for closer surveillance is much stronger. Says Kolkowicz: "Entrusting covert operations to a secretive agency lacking effective supervision amounts to leaving policy to faceless bureaucrats whose judgment is questionable." Although somewhat exaggerated, his warning reflects widespread concern that the CIA may be too independent.

The CIA takes its orders from the 40 Committee, which has existed under various names since 1948. It screens every proposal for clandestine activity. Chaired by Kissinger, the committee is made up of Colby, Deputy Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements Jr., and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General George S. Brown. In his book, Marchetti describes the committee as a rubber stamp that is predisposed to give the CIA what it wants. But others say that the committee frequently rejects or orders revision of CIA proposals. Moreover, recommendations for major covert actions like the Chile operation require presidential approval.

Congress's supervision of the CIA is inadequate; in some respects, it is a myth. A Senate subcommittee headed by conservative Democrat John Stennis of Mississippi meets irregularly and has almost no staff. Member Symington complains that, from the U-2 incident to the Chile affair, the subcommittee has known less about CIA activities than the press. A House subcommittee chaired by liberal Democrat Nedzi meets more often, but he looks on his responsibility "as making a determination as to whether or not the CIA has acted legally, after or during the fact." Thus no one in Congress knows in advance about potentially controversial CIA operations. Complains Democratic Representative Michael J. Harrington of Massachusetts: "There is a studied inclination in Congress toward noninvolvement, superimposed on a pattern of deference toward the Executive Branch. If the Executive is in the dock, you have got to put