(8 of 10)
In the postwar era, covert action seemed eminently justifiable on the grounds that the U.S. was in a mortal struggle with the Communist world. Now that the cold war has abated and Communism is no longer a monolith, many scholars, diplomats and congressional leaders favor ending the CIA'S covert operations altogether, leaving it an intelligence-gathering agency.
No Secret. The reasons are both moral and practical. Says Richard N. Gardner, an international-law specialist at Columbia University: "Dirty tricks have always been immoral and illegal. Now they also have outlived their usefulness." Former Ambassador to the Soviet Union George Kennan disapproves of covert operations as "improper and undesirable." But he also disapproves for pragmatic reasons: "The fact that we can't keep them secret is reason enough to desist." U.C.L.A. Soviet Specialist Roman Kolkowicz argues: "The track record is deplorable. By and large, these operations have been a series of disasters." Adds Eugene Skolnikoff, director of M.I.T.'s Center for International Studies: "The resulting scandals provide grist for attacks on the U.S., retroactively validate charges—true or false—that the U.S. makes a habit of overthrowing governments, and even exacerbate domestic distrust of public officials."
Last week Democratic Senator James M. Abourezk of South Dakota sponsored legislation that would prohibit the CIA from "assassination, sabotage, political disruption or other meddling in a nation's internal affairs, without the approval of Congress or the knowledge of the American people." That proposal is unlikely to be enacted because most Congressmen believe that restricting the CIA would unwisely limit the President's freedom of action.
Further, says William Bundy, former CIA officer and now editor of Foreign Affairs: "The last thing in the world that is ever going to disappear is Soviet covert activities of a political nature. To say détente stops them is grossly naive." Thus Bundy argues that the U.S. should not be precluded from covert actions, but should not use such actions as extensively as in the 1950s. Bowdoin College Provost Olin Robinson, an authority on intelligence organizations in democratic societies, agrees: "Unless you've got a cast of world characters who are willing to play by a certain set of rules, you're going to have covert operations." In other words, the CIA should be left the capacity for covert action but forbidden to use it except in tightly restricted circumstances.
Colby himself believes that more stress on intelligence gathering will make it less likely that various situations will develop into crises; the occasions where covert action might be considered would thus be reduced. But he maintains that to prohibit the CIA from conducting any covert actions would "leave us with nothing between a diplomatic protest and sending in the Marines."
Ideas vary about what limits should be set. Harry Howe Ransom, professor of political science and an intelligence specialist at Vanderbilt University, believes that "covert operations represent an act just short of war. If we use them, it should be where acts of war would otherwise be