(2 of 3)
The Paris accord calls for a National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, composed of the Saigon government, the Provisional Revolutionary Government and South Vietnamese neutrals. Its effectiveness will be limited, if not paralyzed, by the fact that any action it takes must be unanimous. But as Thieu well knows, the council could eventually be transformed into a base for a new "coalition" of Communists and neutrals that could bring him down. In his forthcoming discussions with the P.R.G., Thieu is unlikely to give an inch on any crucial issue.
Partly because of Thieu's cunning political footwork, his position today is very strong—much more so than it was three months ago. He has stayed on working terms with the U.S. while tightening his control over the Saigon government. He has also shown that he can stand up to American pressure, and this in turn has increased his popularity at home. His army is large and well equipped, and is assured of continued U.S. military assistance on a one-for-one replacement basis. He will also have the help of perhaps 5,000 civilian advisers.
But Thieu has to worry not only about the North Vietnamese troops left in the South but about Washington's long-term intentions. The U.S. retains airbases in Thailand, and if the North Vietnamese were to mount another military offensive against South Viet Nam within six or eight months, they would have reason to fear U.S. bombing. But what if the crisis comes in two or three years—perhaps in the form of a coup or a Communist-fed revolt? Would the U.S. take military action to assist Thieu? It seems unlikely.
Other Wars. For this reason, many U.S. officials in Saigon anticipate a gradual increase in anti-Americanism. Some, in fact, believe that Thieu himself has already begun to encourage such a trend. After a recent speech by the President to a group of officer cadets at Dalat, several trainees spread the word that the Americans had conspired to permit Communist infiltration of South Vietnamese cities in the Tet offensive of 1968, that the U.S. was dilatory in delivering air strikes at Quang Tri City during the Communists' 1972 offensive, and that Henry Kissinger had betrayed South Viet Nam in his secret talks with the North Vietnamese. Some diplomats believe that Hanoi may seek to capitalize on South Viet Nam's disenchantment with Washington by strengthening its own U.S. contacts.
There remains, moreover, the unanswered problem of the other wars in Southeast Asia. Last week the Laotian Premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, predicted that fighting in his country would stop by mid-February. The Cambodian government announced a three-day cease-fire to give the Communists a chance to stop fighting if they wanted to. Cambodian President Lon Nol also made plans to participate in peace talks with the Khmer Rouge Communists and aides of deposed Prince Norodom Sihanouk. The prospects for a lasting peace in Laos and particularly in Cambodia, however, seemed at least as dubious as in South Viet Nam.