BASED on past experience," South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu declared recently, referring to the 1954 Geneva agreement, "we cannot rely too much on international treaties, for the Communists do not respect them. Nor can we rely too much on the International Control Commission." More pointedly he advised his countrymen: "If a stranger enters your village, shoot him in the head."
Thieu's comments may well prove to be prophetic about the immediate future of South Viet Nam. The cease-fire really marks the beginning of a period of prolonged uncertainty—and perhaps of yet a new stage in the war. Now only an overwhelming effort of good will, it would seem, will permit cooperation between the opposing armed forces and their political cadres, and such an agreement is not in evidence.
When the cease-fire began last weekend, the South Vietnamese had 1,100,000 men under arms. They controlled most of the country's populated areas, including all of its 44 provincial capitals and ten major cities. The Communists claim to control more than 2,500,000 people, or about 14% of South Viet Nam's total population of 17,500,000; in reality the number is probably closer to 500,000. Some intelligence officials believe that Hanoi and the Viet Cong will shift immediately after the cease-fire to widespread but small-scale guerrilla tactics. More likely the Communists will keep guerrilla activity to a minimum until the U.S. withdrawal is completed.
More significant is the number of troops that the North Vietnamese are permitted to leave in South Viet Nam —145,000 by Washington's estimate, 300,000 by Saigon's. "What kind of peace is it," President Thieu demanded recently, "that gives the North Vietnamese the right to keep their troops here?" His pessimistic prediction is that a "next war" will be required to destroy the country's Communist underground. "This war may last six months, one year or two years," he says. "It will decide the up political future of Viet Nam."
If one or both sides want to resume fighting, it is not clear how the combatants can be kept apart. Considering the built-in limitations of the ICC (see box, page 17), the effectiveness of the cease-fire would seem to depend mostly on the spirit of observance by the Vietnamese—a proud, stubborn, subtle people who can quietly nurture hate until the moment of retribution arrives.
In the political struggle within South Viet Nam, it may well be that the "neutral" or "middle" factions will take on greater importance than in the recent past. Such groups as the Cao Dai, portions of the Dai Viet Party, the Buddhists, the progressive Roman Catholics and the Hoa Hao might emerge as viable alternatives to supporters of President Thieu. He bases his hopes for survival on the backing of a coalition composed of conservative Catholics as well as the Thieu-dominated military and civil services, opposed by a manageable minority made up of the Hoa Hao, the Buddhists, the Cao Dais and a few others. Thieu has bitter enemies within the military hierarchy, however, and new alliances within the army could be created quickly—particularly if the Nixon Administration were to hint that its support for Thieu was wavering.