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They were all reactionaries who stood in the way of republicanism, to be sure, but Metternich and Castlereagh particularly understood the need for "legitimate" political structures, for satisfying national (if not popular) aspirations, for balancing the powers of their day. Says Kissinger: "An international order, the basic arrangements of which are accepted by all the major powers, may be called 'legitimate.' " The world conceived in the Congress of Vienna ultimately crumbled, but only after a century of relative peace. The Germany constructed by Bismarck blundered into a fate of blood and new division, but only after the Iron Chancellor lost power. And the failures give Kissinger another lesson to teach Americans: great states disintegrate, and so can theirs. "Nothing is more difficult for Americans to understand than the possibility of tragedy."
Kissinger is European by birth and a Europeanist by doctrine. For the U.S., he says, "international success or failure will ultimately be determined in the Atlantic area." His constant theme in criticizing the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations' approach to the Atlantic Alliance was that they operated from insufficient understanding and flexibility. In his view, once the Marshall Plan had served its purpose and NATO was firmly established, American predominance made less and less sense. Washington's master plans for Western Europe became increasingly irrelevant. Why should not Charles de Gaulle pursue his own vision of a European third force? Why should the military commander of NATO always be an American? For Kissinger, who believes that the age of superpowers is drawing to an end, the growth of independence in Western Europe is natural and desirable.
When he travels to Western Europe next week with Nixon and Rogers, the tour will be something of a personal triumph for Kissinger. It represents, if only symbolically at the moment, a renewal of the kind of relationship that he has advocated. Europeans are intensely, if not always justifiably, suspicious of American attempts to guide their policies, and are increasingly resentful of the growing U.S. involvement in their economies. Kissinger believes that the Atlantic nations can cooperate closely in many spheres, once they can agree on what he calls "coalitions of shared purposes." Precisely what these purposes will be, beyond the obvious mutual interest of defense, remains to be worked out by Nixon diplomacy.
The Disraeli Conservative
Kissinger calls himself a political independent. "If I were in 19th century Great Britain," he says, "I might be a Disraeli Conservative in domestic affairs, but not in foreign policy." Disraeli was an unabashed imperialist. Kissinger, by contrast, believes that U.S. power must not be spread too thinly, especially in politically underdeveloped areas that Americans little understand.