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M.I.T. Professor George Rathjens, who was until 1965 assistant to the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, summarized the case for prompt action last month: "We are in effect at a crossroads. We and the Soviet Union now have a better chance than we are likely to have in the foreseeable future to make decisions that may enable us to avoid or at least moderate another spiral in the strategic-arms race."
But the Nixon Administration thinks it has considerable leeway. It believes that no vital decisions must be made in the next few months, at least, that would commit the U.S. irrevocably to further nuclear escalation. During this period, a determination can be made whether broad-scale talks with the Russians are feasible.
Meanwhile, the U.S. debate over the arms question is taking on national proportions, spurred largely by the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) project called Sentinel. Until 1967, McNamara resisted pressure from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to go ahead with this type of weapon. Many scientists and civilian planners argued that it was always easier and cheaper for the adversary to improve his offensive equipment by using decoys, multiple warheads and other devices, than it was for the other side to build an adequate defense. It thus seemed wiser to continue to improve the U.S. offensive capability, thereby perpetuating what the planners call "assured destruction," the ability to devastate the Soviet Union even after absorbing a first strike.
While work on new U.S. offensive missiles continued, the Russians accelerated expansion of their attack force at a faster rate than Washington had anticipated, and had begun deploying their own ABM system around Moscow. The Soviet catch-up drive, together with China's nuclear development program and the approaching 1968 election, finally pushed the Johnson Administration into the ABM competition. Under Johnson, the U.S. planned a so-called "thin" ABM system, at an estimated cost of $5 billion, to protect against a relatively primitive Chinese missile attack in the 1970s. However, many believe that the project, once begun, would inevitably grow into a "thick" defense against a Russian strike at a cost of $50 billion or more. Last week the Nixon Administration temporarily halted work on the Sentinel pending a new review. Intelligence reports indicate that the Russians, probably because they questioned its efficiency, last year slowed installation of their ABM system.
What is relatively certain is that the U.S. at the moment retains the capacity to decimate any enemy, although the Russians have come a long way in catching up in numerical terms. Both sides are pressing ahead with technical advances, although the U.S. has a substantial lead. One example: the newest Russian missile, the SS-13, is roughly the equivalent of the U.S Minuteman I, which is already being replaced with a later, much improved model. A still more modern weapon, containing multiple warheads capable of individual targeting (the MIRV missile), will be operational in about two years. Russia is also working on a MIRV. In the category of warheads available for use in what the military call a "wargasm"—a ghastly coinage meaning a sudden, total conflict—the Pentagon reported only last month that the U.S. leads 4,200 to 1,200.