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In any negotiations, the key issue is likely to be the future political role of the Viet Cong. They are certain to demand several Cabinet seats, and there are those who feel that the U.S. must be just as certain to refuse. "If you give the Viet Cong the Interior Ministry," says one senior U.S. diplomat, "that means you lose. If you give them anything less, it's meaningless." But the U.S. is willing to see the Viet Cong get some political representation. The State Department has indicated as much. The V.C. certainly might be recognized as a political party, and it is not entirely out of the question that they might be permitted to administer the hamlets that they now control, which, by the government's probably optimistic estimate, contain only 17% of the population. In that kind of arrangement, the Thieu-Ky administration would keep hold of the central government, all the cities, and those rural areas that it controls.
Not surprisingly, the Thieu-Ky forces bitterly oppose any such plan. But Communist cadres have been working hard on their villages for years and, although under increasing military pressure, their political infrastructure remains essentially intact. For the central government, the problem is not merely rooting out that infrastructure, but also creating an effective anti-Communist substitute. This the government has been unable to do, partly because the Viet Cong have so coolly assassinated practically every mayor, doctor, teacher or engineer who opposed them in areas that they dominate.
One basis for compromise might be that the Viet Cong would lay down their arms and agree to stop their violence in return for political rights—much as the French Communists did in a deal with De Gaulle in 1945. Then, in the next South Vietnamese election in 1970, the Viet Cong could put up candidates for office, along with the non-Communist parties. There is some doubt that many Reds would want to run for office in government-controlled areas—city people tend to equate the Viet Cong with assassins, and quite a few have old scores to settle. Though the Viet Cong are a powerful political force in some parts of the country. South Viet Nam stands a good chance of voting a non-Communist majority because of its sociological complexity—a characteristic that, ironically, has discouraged and dismayed many Americans. The people are fragmented into a multiplicity of racial, regional, religious and political groups and sects. It is quite possible that in most election districts, the candidate of the dominant group—Buddhist or Catholic, Cao Dai or Hoa Hao, Southern native or Northern refugee—would beat the Communist.