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It must be assumed that any U.S. approach to negotiations would begin with the premise that this is a war not so much about South Viet Nam as it is about all of Asia. The basic U.S. goal—which is imperfectly understood because it has been inexpertly explained—is to contain Communism and in the process prove to aggressors from Peking to Havana that so-called wars of liberation will not be allowed to succeed. With that in mind, the maximum immediate U.S. goal is to suppress the Viet Cong rebellion, push out the North Vietnamese invaders, preserve South Viet Nam's non-Communist status—and win solid guarantees that the situation will stay stable. The maximum Communist goal, of course, is just the opposite: throw out the Americans, depose the Thieu-Ky government, and establish a regime controlled by the Viet Cong. The V.C. would then unify with the North and support—at least in principle—Communist-fueled wars of liberation elsewhere in the world.
Beneath the rhetoric, there is understandably some give in both positions.
The U.S. now can think in terms short of total victory for three main reasons. First, the war has proved to be costlier in lives, treasure and international prestige than the U.S. anticipated when it began fighting in earnest almost three years ago. Second, while the primary goal has been elusive, the U.S. has accomplished some of its lesser objectives in Viet Nam. Its intervention has bought time—time for such nations as Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia to reinforce their own political, economic and military defenses against subversion. And it has helped the process of nation-building in a truncated chunk of a former French colony; for all its political deficiencies, South Viet Nam is at least starting toward democracy. Third, and perhaps most important, the U.S. became involved in Viet Nam at least partly because of a desire to contain Chinese expansionism; in the past two years, China's internal upheavals have made it far less threatening.
Considering these factors, what could the U.S. settle for now? Instead of aiming for firm guarantees that South Viet Nam will be forever free of aggression from within and without, the U.S. might honorably accept an arrangement that would give the country a reasonable chance of success. In broad terms, it might consider a peace that would arrest Communism instead of smashing it.
Evacuation & Inspection
The Communists have scaled down their goals. Shortly after the U.S. air raids began in early 1965, North Viet Nam stopped demanding "immediate reunification" and "immediate departure of U.S. troops." In messages to their cadres, the Viet Cong now say that they may agree to the setting up of a coalition government in the South while U.S. troops remain on the scene. This might serve as a basis for negotiations, but from the U.S. viewpoint, there is a major sticking point. The Communists have never retreated from that part of their maximum demand which insists that the affairs of South Viet Nam must be directed "in accordance with the program of the National Liberation Front"—meaning control by the Viet Cong.