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British and U.S. oil executives, though admitting to some uneasiness about Nasser's intentions, see no immediate threat to the Middle East's daily flow of 6,500,000 bbl. "We have learned to live with political instability." says one oilman stoically. Their fear is not that the West will lose access to the Middle East's proven oil reserves of 194 billion bbl., but that any new Arab grouping might start a campaign to reduce the producer's profits. "Arab unity may be good or bad for the oil industry," explained one official. "It depends on the goals of unity—and these are difficult to discern in the present situation."
Drawn Line. Sharply hostile after Nasser's Suez nationalization, and nervous at his flirtation with the Communists, U.S. policy more recently has turned in Nasser's favor. Recalling the days not so long ago when Cairo Radio was spouting ugly lies about the U.S., Washington is not inclined to be Nasser's sponsor. But the U.S. can cooperate with the man whose name is on every Arab lip. Officially, the U.S. aims at assisting any government, no matter what its form, that appears to be sincerely and effectively working for internal development and the good of its people. With indifference to social systems, the U.S. has aided Egypt on the left and Iran on the right, recognized the monarchies of Jordan and Saudi Arabia as well as pro-Nasser Yemen. But there is a line drawn by the U.S. "If the cold war in the Arab world threatens the large American interests in, say, Saudi Arabia, we'll have to take a stand," says a U.S. official.
Similarly, the U.S. considers itself non-aligned in the struggle between Israel and the Arab world. Washington's attitude toward Arab union is still tied to a pronouncement made by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles during the Eisenhower Administration. Dulles said then, and it was repeated last week in Washington, that the U.S. looks with favor on any movement toward Arab union that is not imposed from outside the Arab world.
Great Coups. Nasser today takes an indulgent view of the U.S. His earlier resentments, he says, resulted from American attempts to force Egypt into joining such "imperialist" groupings as the Mediterranean Defense Organization and the Baghdad Pact. Nasser applauds the present Administration in Washington because "Kennedy tried from the first to understand us and to be realistic when facing the Arab world. Under John Foster Dulles, the U.S. withdrew its aid for the Aswan Dam. we faced blockade and even the blocking of our own money in U.S. banks." However, Nasser concedes, "it should not be forgotten that the U.S. stood by us in the United Nations during the Suez crisis, and that left a good impression."