Whatever else Watergate critics say about President Nixon, they have usually been willing to concede his mastery in foreign relations. But these days Europeans are beginning to doubt Nixon's wisdom even in foreign affairs—at least in Europe. While Nixon and Henry Kissinger still call for a bold New Atlantic Charter, a host of anxieties about America's intentions plague Europeans.
They are particularly troubled by the new chummy atmosphere between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. At the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, held in Helsinki and attended by 35 Foreign Ministers (TIME, July 16), the Europeans openly voiced their suspicions that Nixon may have made too many concessions to Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev. They suspected that Nixon gave in to the Russians on such issues as mutual—but not necessarily balanced—troop withdrawals and nuclear deescalation.
Typical of how widespread are European suspicions was a proposal made by Rumania's President Nicolae Ceausescu in May that lesser countries on both sides might have to band together to avoid becoming the hapless victims of the two superpowers. Though the idea struck Italians as overly suspicious then, TIME Correspondent Jordan Bonfante now reports that "since the summit and Helsinki there seems to be a new wave, or at least a sizable ripple, of comparable misgivings among the Italians too."
First Taste. West Germany fears especially the Nixon-Brezhnev Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, which calls for urgent bilateral consultations in the event of the risk of nuclear war, but provides for only subsidiary talks with America's European allies. Chancellor Willy Brandt got a first taste of the agreement when he received no more than a vaguely worded letter from Nixon only 48 hours before the agreement was signed. From Bonn, TIME Correspondent Bruce Nelan reports that "the reaction to the nuclear agreement was a collective gasp in Western Europe. Almost everyone believes that De Gaulle is now vindicated in his view that the U.S. would not risk nuclear destruction to defend Europe or risk New York to save Hamburg."
No one is saying whether the French would be any more eager to put Paris on the line for Berlin. At any rate Europeans are anxious to have assurances of a U.S. nuclear umbrella. It was partly to allay that anxiety that Washington invited West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel to Washington last week for hastily arranged talks with Nixon and Kissinger. Scheel presumably re-emphasized German fears that the Nixon-Brezhnev agreement robs NATO of nuclear credibility and opens the door to Soviet blackmail.
Less ostensibly perturbed about America's motives, British officials nonetheless have their own fears. They are especially disappointed with Washington's failure to demand more concessions from the Russians. TIME London Correspondent William McWhirter reports that while British officials have been pleased with the frankness of U.S. briefings about the Nixon-Brezhnev talks, "they remain cynical, suspicious and disenchanted about the haste with which the U.S. traded away its own leverage over Soviet policy. It seems to the British that the Communists now have a short-term license to ruthlessly consolidate power within their own bloc—without fear of U.S. interference."