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An example cited by the British of America's permissive attitude toward the Soviets was the performance of Secretary of State William Rogers at the Helsinki conference. Britons tartly note that Rogers made scant mention of the need for freer movement of people; they disparagingly compare his mild remarks to the tough stand taken by British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home. "It is as if," reports McWhirter, "the British see a crude trade at work in the U.S.-Soviet détente—something along the lines that Moscow would overlook Watergate if Washington forgave Prague." Says Critic George Steiner: "There is an absolute conviction that to overcome his terrible weakness Mr. Nixon sold everything to Brezhnev. It would never have happened in a confident White House." Or, as one British official told the New York Times's Anthony Lewis: "The contempt the Nixon Administration has shown for its own society inevitably raises questions about its attitude in foreign relations."
As seen from Washington, the European attitude is irritating for three main reasons:
> Excessive suspicion. For Europeans, who see themselves caught between two superpowers, it takes only a little imagination to invent innumerable diabolical theories to explain every American action, no matter how straightforward or innocent.
> Inconsistency. Only a few years ago, France's General de Gaulle was still breaking the ice for the West in Moscow. Now that the thaw is on, Europeans have performed a complete turnabout. Where they once damned the U.S. for risking war because of its cold war policy, they now go out of their way to pick apart Washington's motives for seeking a détente. Complaints about allowing Moscow to consolidate its hold on Eastern Europe are partly unrealistic: it has been evident for years that very little—short of war—can be done to dislodge that hold.
> Inability to unite. European nations complain that they are being treated separately and as lesser powers by the U.S. But they have failed to get together in a united Western Europe grouping that might deal on more nearly equal terms with the superpowers and maintain its own united nuclear force.
Mutual irritation aside, there are some genuine conflicts between the U.S. and its European allies, foremost among them the instability of the dollar (see ECONOMY & BUSINESS) and the presence of 313,000 U.S. troops on the Continent. International Affairs Expert Michel Tatu of Le Monde recently wrote that U.S. insistence on Europe's increasing its financial support for U.S. troops stationed in Europe "makes the G.I.s in West Germany look even more like Europe's mercenaries, which is insulting to the dignity of both parties." Why should Europe not say to the U.S. President: "Admit that your troops are not in Europe out of love but because you have vital interests here." The U.S. could then fix a time limit for withdrawal gradual enough to enable Europe to take up the slack.