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The dilemma is one that Goldwater seeks to solve with some rather fuzzy talk about "sharing." Says he: "All NATO forces stationed in Europe, regardless of nationality, should be equipped and trained in the use of nuclear weapons, particularly of the so-called battlefield, or tactical, variety." Goldwater has been criticized for this stand, and last week in Seattle, President Johnson, even while admitting that "the dignity and interests of our allies demand that they share nuclear responsibility," warned against the fearful possibility of "nuclear spread."
Yet despite the fact that Goldwater is suffering political damage from his talk about "sharing," the possibility of doing just that has been discussed by NATO-nation leaders for years. The so-called Multilateral Force, first formally promulgated by President Kennedy, is one effort to solve the problem. Under the MLF plan, atom-armed surface ships and submarines would be manned by mixed crews from all the NATO nations, and any one of those nations would have a veto power over a decision to fire a nuclear weapon.
As of now, the structure of MLF is still being negotiated, and the plan does not seem likely to go much farther. Last week a new and far more sophisticated "sharing" plan was proposed by NATO's onetime Commander Norstad (see box).
Deterrent by Declaration. The most obvious proposition in the debate over the use and control of nuclear weapons is that no one wants a nuclear war. Despite all the hot words, this is as true of Goldwater as of Johnson.
Goldwater believes that the best deterrent to such a war is a clear and well-understood declaration that the U.S. will, if necessary, defend its vital international interests with nuclear weaponry. In urging this point, he has indulged in some imprecise language.
He has helped create for himself the political image of a man who would consider using atomic weapons to "defoliate" trees in South Viet Nam so as to deprive Communist guerrillas of their protective jungle cover. He has been mistaken in saying that the smallest nuclear weapon is no more powerful than World War II artillery charges. He has, in many ways, given the impression of a man who does not really know what he is talking about, and should not, therefore, be permitted to put his atomic ignorance into effect as national policy.
Johnson, superb politician that he is, has taken advantage of almost everything Goldwater has said. Campaigning for re-election as the great peace keeper, he keeps invoking "national security" as a brake on what he can say. But he has not said all he could, and he has indulged in some imprecision himself. He gets across the notion, for instance, that Goldwater is irresponsible and reckless because he has suggested that NATO's supreme commander ought to be given some sort of contingency authority for using tactical nuclear weapons—at a time when General Lemnitzer, under a delegation of power from Johnson, has just such authority.
One Billion Tons. Will the nuclear issue be clarified, and cooled off, before election day? Perhaps too much has already been said, and badly said at that, by the two candidates, for them ever to engage in meaningful debate.