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Crossing the "Fire Break." The Administration's fear of firing any sort of nuclear weapon is based largely on the so-called "fire break" theory. That theory holds that the single step from use of the largest gunpowder weapon to use of the smallest tactical nuclear weapon would mean crossing the "fire break" area between limited war and all-out, intercontinental, thermonuclear disaster. Says Vance: "Once you use any nuclear device, no matter how small, you move completely into another world."
Yet the fact is that since 1954, NATO itself has based its defense planning, even against conventional attack, on "using atomic weapons from the outset of a war." In a mere gunpowder war, NATO planners estimate that their forces could withstand a massive Soviet attack for a bare three days before being forced back to the banks of the Rhine; within 30 days the NATO troops would be swept from the Continent.
Some Strange Blips. Goldwater argues that such critical-area commanders as NATO's Lemnitzer should be given atomic discretion because there is always the possibility that a communications breakdown might consume vital hours before word of a crisis got to Washington. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's civilian Pentagon says that argument is nonsense, boasts of a worldwide U.S. communications setup that could put a commander in touch with the President within two minutes under any conceivable circumstances.
Last week Goldwater's point received new credibility. The Pentagon went into a headline-screaming flap over reports of another Tonkin Gulf incident. U.S. destroyers in the area reported seeing strange blips on their radar screens, assumed a new attack by North Vietnamese PT boats, started firing. But, if only because of the confusion existing on the destroyers, communication with the Pentagon failed to make clear what actually was happening.
It was a full 28 hours before a tight-lipped McNamara appeared before newsmen to read a 146-word communiqué and refused to entertain any questions. Gist of his statement: two unnamed U.S. destroyers "were menaced" by four "unidentified vessels" and opened fire, after which the "vessels" disappeared.
Between the original alarm and the denouement, Goldwater seized upon the opportunity to deride the communications system. Snorted Barry: "With the great communications system which McNamara is always bragging about, they are waiting for an airmail letter to find out just what did happen."
Planning to Share. Another element of nuclear "control" has to do with the sharing of nuclear weapons by the U.S. and its NATO allies. Under present law, the U.S. cannot turn over any of its nukes to any ally to be fired at the ally's discretion. But the NATO allies feel strongly that they should have more than nominal influence over the use of the U.S. nuclear weapons that are, after all, their only real defense against Communist invasion.