West Germany: The Heart of Europe

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enough view: "Month after month the facts have increasingly confirmed the correctness of the French position. It is becoming clear that Europe, whether she wishes to or not, must count more and more on herself. And would it not be better for her to be able to defend herself not with human chests but also with nuclear weapons? 'Big Lift' is perhaps a gigantic transport operation. But it is above all a little 'Operation Truth.' "

One truth is simply this: However desirable or inevitable the long-run reduction of U.S. forces in Europe, it can scarcely take place except within the framework of an overall, sensible policy for Europe's nuclear defense.

Washington's present position is that this must remain a U.S. responsibility. While the majority of Europeans might be willing to leave it at that, the Gaullist argument that in the 20th century only the possession of nuclear weapons can make a nation truly sovereign, simply will not die down. And sooner or later the Germans are bound to take it up, for the most powerful country in Europe, with a technical capacity probably greater than France's, cannot indefinitely be kept in the position of a second-class citizen without the nuclear rights its allies and neighbors possess.

The only alternative to these national nuclear aspirations would be a truly international force or a genuine defense partnership between the U.S. and Europe, with shared control of the Bomb. Washington's hesitant and plainly inadequate move in that direction is represented by the multilateral force (MLF), a clumsy concept loved by no soldier, which foresees a boat in some distant sea with a Russia-aimed bomb on board. At the throttle is a German and at the rudder a Briton. Luxembourgeois, Belgians and Dutchmen run the galley, and a Frenchman (if he can be enticed on board at all) is topside yelling "to port" while an Italian beside him shouts "to starboard." Use of the Bomb itself would happen only on U.S. orders. To Gaullists, U.S. insistence on a seaborne MLF, rather than one based on solid ground in Europe (which U.S. NATO commanders have always wanted), means further evidence that essentially the U.S. is thinking about disengagement from the Continent.

Gaullists v. Atlanticists. MLF's champions point out that whatever its other shortcomings, at least it gives Germany a hand in nuclear defense without actually giving it nuclear bombs. Bonn, in fact, supports MLF with some enthusiasm, has promised to contribute up to 40% of the cost. But even as far as the Germans are concerned, MLF cannot really settle the problem of European defense, which is having growing repercussions in German politics. With the departure of one Chancellor and the arrival of another, a whole new political scene is being set. Emerging in Bonn is the as yet shapeless pattern of a new political alignment that may strain the unity of the ruling Christian Democratic party. The opposing factions are known as the Gaullists and the Atlanticists.

The Gaullists include Konrad Aden auer, increasingly suspicious of U.S. aims, former Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss, former Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano, and Bundestag Deputy Karl Theodor Baron von Guttenberg. They are all more or less sympathetic to De Gaulle's concept of a little Europe, with "Anglo-Saxon" influences diminished,