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Another argument is that a sizable American cutback would provide the right amount of pressure to force Europe to put up more for its own defense. The U.S. feels that it is the only country that is really expected to fulfill its obligations under NATO and that even the dedicated Germans tend to find excuses for not fielding more troops, citing the country's severe industrial manpower shortage. But whether a U.S. reduction would have the desired effect is doubtful. Charles de Gaulle, for one, has deprived NATO of some French troops on a considerably smaller pretense, and Britain, beset by balance-of-payments problems of its own, would gladly find excuses to pull back its Rhine army; already the London Daily Express advises its readers that if the U.S. can swiftly fly divisions across the Atlantic, it would be all the easier for Britain to perform the same stunt across the Channel.
The Elusive Trip Wires. The most serious argument for a troop pullback is the "trip wire" theory, advanced by Eisenhower, among others. The notion is that if the Russians were to attack Berlin or West Germany, for example, this would lead to a nuclear war anyway; thus even a handful of U.S. soldiers on the scene would be enough to engage America and to invite immediate nuclear retribution.
Most Washington planners feel that this theory had merit while the U.S. enjoyed its nuclear monopoly, but cannot be applied to a period of approximate nuclear parity between East and West. In such a situation, according to dominant Pentagon thinking, the U.S. must have a maximum number of "options" allowing it to hit back on any level appropriate to any attack. If the Russians were to stage various "incidents" at Berlin or even tried to seize some West German territory with conventional force, argue American strategists, the U.S. should not be forced to choose between doing nothing or starting an all-out nuclear war.
Would the U.S. blast Moscow with nuclear weapons because a Soviet ground force nibbles at Hamburg, when the destruction of New York is the certain counterblow? Probably not, reason many Germans. And if the Russians reached the same conclusion, it would serve as a downright invitation to them to try. If the U.S. concedes unchallenged conventional superiority to the Russians, argued former Secretary of State Dean Acheson before a German-Ameri can Club meeting in Bonn last week, the Russians might be able to rack up a series of small but important "profits" in Europe, "without setting off a nuclear response."
That is precisely why the U.S. has been pressing its allies for more conventional forces. A sizable U.S. pullback would undercut that argument—and would greatly strengthen the Gaullist demand for an independent, national nuclear deterrent.
The Nuclear Issue. In Paris last week, French Defense Minister Pierre Messmer was coolly correct about Operation Big Lift. "Tres interessant," he sniffed, courteously refraining from saying I-told-you-so about the widely whispered suggestion that this meant, as Charles de Gaulle had often predicted, the U.S. would retreat from Europe and leave the Continental powers to their own devices. But the Gaullist paper La Nation spelled out a reasonable