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¶ To lengthen the range and life of the B-52 bomber, still the backbone of the U.S. deterrent, the President called for a speedup in the 1,000-mile air-to-ground Skybolt nuclear-tipped missile. He also asked for money to increase the Strategic Air Command's ground-alert readiness from 33½% to 50%, and maintenance of the twelve-plane, 24-hour airborne alert (TIME, March 17). And to build greater safety into the command system whose responsibility it is to order these deterrent forces into action, Kennedy wants massive improvement in communications and warnings systems, all aimed at assuring a fail-safe intelligence system so that "our retaliatory power does not rest on decisions made in ambiguous circumstances, or permit a catastrophic mistake."
¶ "The free world's security," wrote the President, "can be endangered not only by a nuclear attack, but also by being nibbled away at the periphery, regardless of our strategic power, by forces of subversion, infiltration, intimidation, indirect or non-overt aggression, internal revolution, diplomatic blackmail, guerrilla warfare or a series of limited wars." The Kennedy requirements: fresh hardware, from trucks to non-nuclear field weapons and ammunition, some to be stockpiled overseas; a boost from 50 to 129 long-range planes for airlift; increased sealift and tactical aircraft; a token addition of 13,000 men for expansion of Polaris, SAC, the Marine Corps and guerrilla forces.
Selective Response. The Kennedy program is laced with signs of basic new decisions. In the buildup of conventional forces, Kennedy & Co. intend to sink without a trace whatever might be left of the Dulles doctrine of replying massively to less-than-total attacks with instant retaliation "by means and at places of our own choosing." Largely at the urging of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the Kennedy Administration is moving away from attempting to defend any very large segment of the globe with the threat of nuclear war, although the threat still is the kingpin of NATO. Nevertheless, Kennedy planners are thinking more clearly about nuclear attack than their predecessors. They plan not only to survive but to be able to operate carefully in the pandemonium of a post-attack environment. The message promises careful, selective response even when the U.S. is under fire. The President wants the decision-making power in his own hands or those of his ranking civilian survivor. He sees precision command as an opportunity to reduce losses in event of war, to fight a carefully controlled campaign, and suggests even the possibility of an ability to communicate with an enemy during a campaign. Glaring void in the otherwise far-sighted nuclear attack plan: lack of any provision for nuclear fallout shelters, which would cut casualties by millions.