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To Kennedy, the concept of winning brought no visions of apocalyptic preventive attack—in fact last week he specifically pledged that the U.S. would never launch such an attack. It meant a fusion of arms and diplomacy, a re-examination of weapons and weapons systems in the light of their ability to counter and best the Communists at all levels. It meant decisions made at the White House—a command post located, to the President's mind, midway between the State Department and the Pentagon. And in matters of brass-tacks operation it meant a Pentagon of a thousand capabilities, run not to compromise a thousand rivalries but to achieve the skillful use of American force with single-minded purpose and sureness. Kennedy is convinced that his Secretary of Defense, serious, bespectacled Robert McNamara, 44, the ex-Air Force whiz kid who came to Washington from the presidency of the Ford Motor Co., is the kind of man to run his kind of Pentagon.
Doctrine for Action. Last week the Kennedy-McNamara blueprint for action was unveiled in the President's special defense message to Congress. Like all Kennedy messages, it was short on specific recommendations (TIME, March 31) and long on doctrine. Also like all Kennedy messages it showed the hand of the Administration's team of scholars, reflecting concepts that came more out of thoughtful books than thoughtful brass. If the doctrine is a guide for action, Robert McNamara is going to have the liveliest administration since the Defense Department was first formed.
"The primary purpose of our arms," wrote the President, "is peace, not war—
"To make certain that they will never have to be used;
"To deter all wars, general or limited, nuclear or conventional, large or small;
"To convince all potential aggressors that any attack would be futile;
"To provide backing for diplomatic settlement of disputes;
"To insure the adequacy of our bargaining power for an end to the arms race;
"Diplomacy and defense are no longer distinct alternatives, one to be used where the other fails—both must complement each other."
Major elements in the Kennedy-McNamara new look:
¶ The U.S.'s strategic nuclear force still remains the keystone of national security, but the Kennedy corollaries bring it sharply up to date. The U.S. is still committed to receiving the first surprise blow," but to make the privilege as unattractive as possible to the Soviets, Kennedy put major emphasis on the submarine-borne Polaris missile, since Polaris subs will be able to survive the blow and retaliate from the sea. Kennedy's program: ten additional Polaris subs (bringing the total force to 29), to be turned out at the rate of one a month by 1963. To make Polaris submarines even less vulnerable, the President provided extra funds to extend the range of the Polaris missile from 1,500 miles to 2,500 miles so submarines will not have to lie so close inshore to reach Soviet targets.
¶ Backing up Polaris is the long-range, solid-fueled Minuteman, the Air Force's second-generation missile. Kennedy's program: 150 additional Minutemen, plus a new stand-by production line. The plan to put Minutemen on mobile railroad cars was pigeonholed, but three additional fixed installations were approved.