(9 of 10)
Needless to say, there are no atomic piles, rocket research centers or bacteriological warfare centers.
The Yugoslav army could not resist attacks by the Russians across the 1,300 miles of frontiers shared by Yugoslavia with the four neighbors with whom she is at odds (Bulgaria, Ru mania, Albania, Hungary). If Russia invades, she will be able to sweep across the northern plains from the Hungarian and Rumanian frontiers.
Tito is wisely not prepared to fight more than a delaying action on the plains. In the mountains which cover most of the country south of the Sava River, Russian difficulties would be gin. In a short time Tito could have 1,500,000 fighting army men and guerrillas in the mountains. This army would be broken up into elements of not more than 200, to fight the long guerrilla war Tito knows best.
Tito recently told a friend: "If we are attacked, it will not be an isolated incident. It will start a world war." Though the U.S. is expected to help the Yugoslavs against Stalin's armed aggression, the U.S. is not popular with Tito and his henchmen. The aid of decadent capitalism is simply accepted as a means of sur vival. Direct attacks against the U.S. have stopped, but many middle-level Communists still feel that the U.S. is the wolf and Soviet Russia fundamentally the right boy friend who just happens to be acting badly.
What Not to Do
In this complex situation, the U.S. is pursuing in Yugoslavia perhaps the most difficult and most adult policy it has ever followed in Europe. It boils down to one of helping Tito (some $25 million in credits so far) and asking nothing in return.
"Tito in a son-of-a-bitch," ruefully remarked an American in Zagreb, "but he's our son-of-a-bitch now." This U.S. policy has been by with great skill, tact and coldbloodedness by the U.S. staff in Belgrade.
In adopting its present policy, the U.S. has also accepted certain grave responsibilities. It has gone beyond containment of Russia in favor of counterattack. In supporting Tito, the U.S.
is not merely defending its legal rights, as in Berlin; it is attacking Stalin in what he considers his own backyard. More, it is supporting an organized political assault on the whole power structure of Soviet imperialism, thus taking the risk of pushing Stalin to the point where he might feel his security threatened.
Politically justified though it may be in helping Tito against Stalin, the U.S. needs to be quite aware of what it is doing. If it is the U.S. intention to give Tito some form of military aid in the event of a Soviet invasion, there is a powerful argument in favor of a public statement to that effect now.
It would unquestionably be a deterrent to Soviet invasion.
And it is probably not in the U.S. interest that Russia should attack Yugoslavia, but rather that Tito should be free to continue in political offensive against Moscow. Most Americans in Yugoslavia are agreed that what the U.S. should not do is 1) promise aid and then not deliver it, or 2) not promise aid when it is the U.S. intention to deliver it.
Up to now, the Yugoslav government has received no assurances of military help from Washington.
It is vital for the clear thinking of Western policymakers that Yugoslavia's Communism never be overlooked. At