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Now I believe we must give our peoples more freedom and a better standard of living." But if he said that, he would be speaking to the people, and the people don't count in a Communist regime, except as producers of norms. Having denounced and destroyed democracy, Tito could not re-embrace it even if he wanted to, because in so doing he would disown his Communist Party, his secret police, his army. All of the privileged, power-holding supporters would desert him as they saw their own power disappearing. Tito, in short, is the willing prisoner of his own system.
The only likely alternatives to Tito are another Titoist or a Stalinist stooge. Either way, Communism remains in Yugoslavia.
The Communist Party machine has a total grip on the nation.
Nothing can overthrow it except the use or possibly the threat of superior forces.
What Next?
Can Stalin break Tito down? Another phase of the Stalin political offensive against Tito is now in progress. The first opened when the "Tito clique" was excommunicated on June 28, 1948. There is no doubt that the Russians seriously miscalculated the situation at that time. They had never run up against Titoism. They expected Yugoslav rulers to be paralyzed by the Olympian thunderbolts of the Cominform and of great Stalin himself. The second push was economic. Russia and her satellites, with whom Yugoslavia had 50% of her trade, in the summer of 1949 denounced all economic agreements. Tito survived by dealing with the West and imposing a further sacrifice on his were standard of living. Last fall, the Russians were plainly alarmed. Titoism was creating havoc among nationalist and opportunist elements in the satellite countries, which could not be kept uncontaminated by Yugoslav propaganda.
The third and current phase, opened a few months ago, consists of isolating the Tito disease, and until a more favorable moment arises, waiting to eradicate it. Hence the spectacular political trials in Hungary and Bulgaria; they were designed to show satellite Communists that there was no security away from Moscow's apron strings. This phase will probably continue until next summer. If Titoism is really isolated by that time, Yugoslav-Russian relations may rock along indefinitely as they are now. If not, if there is increasing unrest among the satellites or in the big Communist parties of the free countries, then Moscow will have to make a tough decision. It will have to consider military action and the risk of a third world war.
The Yugoslavs themselves do not believe the Russians will invade. One official said naively: "Oh, the Russians would never let down socialism to that extent." More realistic was another Communist opinion: "We did not believe the Russians would attack last fall when the rest of the world thought they would. We do not believe it now. We know more about Russian psychology than you. They will prefer to wait it out, hoping to profit by some political mistake or weakness of ours." For all their confidence, the Yugoslavs are taking no chances.
At the moment, the army proper has 33 to 35 divisions of 10,000 men apiece. To this can be added 80.000 militia (KNOJ).
The army has some 400 medium tanks, but half of them are immobilized for lack of
