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De Gaulle protested against this situation as early as 1958, when France had only just begun building its own independent force de frappe, and Eisenhower had turned down a proposal for a U.S., British and French triumvirate to direct the West's global strategy. From that point on, the general gradually withdrew more and more of the French military part of the shield from NATO. Last September he proclaimed: "In 1969, at the latest, the subordination known as 'integration' which is provided for by NATO and which hands our fate over to foreign authority shall cease."
Though the NATO Treaty is for perpetuity, beginning in 1969 any member may resign. De Gaulle presumably was threatening to do just that—but it will hardly mean the end of NATO. The headquarters of the Alliance will have to be moved from Paris, some NATO supply lines rerouted, and the status of U.S. air and logistic bases in France renegotiated. All this might not prove too damaging, for Paris has hinted that it is willing to consider bilateral defense arrangements with Washington. For NATO, France's departure could be awkward but hardly fatal; for De Gaulle, it would be easy and would hardly change a thing. Sheltered behind Germany, France will have to be defended by NATO's sword and shield, member or not, in the event of Russian attack. So De Gaulle can have his gateau and eat it too. The U.S. simply intends to keep an empty chair waiting for France's return at some future date—A.D.G., or apres De Gaulle.
More difficult for the U.S. and NATO is the problem of West Germany, which far from wanting out, wants farther in. Though forbidden by treaty to manufacture its own atomic arms, West Germany, as the most powerful industrial and conventional military power in Europe, has of late come to feel keenly its second-class nuclear status in the Alliance—particularly beside Britain and France. Later this month Erhard will visit President Johnson, and a preview of what is on Erhard's mind came not long ago when he told the Bundestag that the U.S. allies "must be given a share in nuclear defense according to the degree of danger they face and the degree of their burden."
Other West Germans are even more outspoken. The clear long-range danger is that if Germans are to be cast permanently in the role of serfs to the Alliance's nuclear knights, the resulting bitterness will lead to a new outburst of German nationalism. The West Germans know that for the foreseeable future they cannot have nuclear weapons of their own. Germany with the Bomb is a prospect that alarms Western Europe nearly as much as it does Russia and the satellites. What Erhard does want is a greater share in both nuclear planning and in the control over the "hardware" of the tactical weapons on German soil. De Gaulle does not want the Germans to have even that much. "The Germans have lost the war," he reportedly says, "and they must pay for it." This notion overlooks the fact that France did not exactly win the war either.