(2 of 6)
The management of this vast and intricate melding of six highly developed economies is vested by the Rome Treaty in a nine-man commission, now supported by some 3,000 international civil servants headquartered in Brussels. Though the treaty nowhere uses the word supranational, its architects envisioned an inevitable accretion of power wielded by "Eurocrats." Common decisions are taken only at the commission's proposal; the Council of Ministers, representing the governments of the Six, can only dispose, voting yes or no to specific legislation. Under the treaty, a qualified majority vote on most issues is to be binding as of next year, thereby largely eliminating national vetoes. The Eurocrats have almost invariably tried to make every economic advance a political gain for a federated Europe as well, following Common Market President Walter Hallstein's oft-reiterated precept that "we're not in business, we're in politics."
Sooner or later, this supranational thrust was bound to collide with the nationalism of Charles de Gaulle. The bang came last summer when Hallstein and his vice president for agriculture, Sicco Mansholt, tried to lead De Gaulle into accepting a quantum increase in supranationalism. The bait was nearly $1 billion in Common Market subsidies that Brussels would dole out to French farmers under a proposed common agricultural policy. In return, the Six were to hand over to Brussels several billion dollars in farm levies for Hallstein & Co. to control as the technicians saw fit. In fact, this would have created Europe's first federal treasury. At the same time, Hallstein proposed that the European Parliament, so far a purely consultative body, be given a budgetary check on the use of the European monies.
De Gaulle refused, and reportedly yelled: "Do they think we can be bought like Yemen or Italy?" He ordered French diplomats to cease attending Common Market meetings and launched a bitter public offensive against the apatrides, or stateless ones. He railed against a "technocratic, stateless and irresponsible Areopagus, destined to infringe upon French democracy." De Gaulle was irked by Hallstein, a German who acts, says one neutral ambassador in Brussels, like "the uncrowned king of Europe."
The Possible Compromise
The French still refuse to deal with Hallstein, still boycott meetings of the Market's Council of Ministers. They do participate directly in some technical meetings and in others by mail. Though not quite sure of its legal status, the Council not only continues to meet but enacts legislation, cockily firing off letters to the French government that begin: "The Council decided . . ." The other Market partners also invited France to attend a session in which Hallstein and the other commissioners will be excluded.
Despite all this acrimony, the outlines of a possible compromise are already evident. Hallstein and Mansholt will probably have to step down. De Gaulle is not the only one who wants Hallstein out; privately, Germany's Ludwig Erhard is not likely to mourn his countryman's retirement. Beyond trimming the power of the Eurocrats, France wants:
A new farm-financing agreement—bound to benefit France as the most efficient agricultural producer of the Six. This should cause no real trouble.