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During the session De Gaulle asked few questions. He had on his desk three "position papers" from the Ministry of Finance. One of them projected the situation if the franc were devalued at 9.785%—the figure in Le Monde. The second paper outlined a devaluation of 7.5%. The third report, prepared at De Gaulle's personal request, projected the consequences if he were not to devalue at all. When everyone had spoken, the General gave a brief resume of the trends of thought.
Then he scribbled a note on a piece of paper and handed it to Minister of Information Joël le Theule. It said simply that a communique would be issued at 7:45 that evening. Neither Le Theule nor any other Cabinet official, except perhaps Couve, had a clear idea of what the President would do. Typically, De Gaulle did not make his decision known to his Cabinet or talk about his solution. He said only, "Thank you, gentlemen. I will take your views into consideration."
Pride and Principle
Many factors were involved in De Gaulle's decision. One of them was pride. The West Germans had failed to mask their glee at France's discomfiture. In fact, the French first learned of the devaluation discussions in Bonn through press reports quoting West Germany's Finance Minister Franz-Josef Strauss. After the final session, Strauss implied that the devaluation was a foregone conclusion. "The French government has to decide the extent of it," he said.
For De Gaulle, it was also a matter of principle. From the start, the Gaullists have maintained that the crisis was an international affair in which the West German mark was deeply involved. In the French view, the mark was so strong that it was pulling other currencies off balance. By refusing to devalue, De Gaulle could perhaps bring about a situation in which the Germans would be frightened into increasing the exchange rate of the mark. That would automatically strengthen the franc by making German goods dearer on the world market. De Gaulle also knew that a devaluation would frighten the French, reminding them of the financial instability of the Fourth Republic before he came to France's rescue.
De Gaulle announced that the next day he would go on the radio to explain what he intended to do to defend the franc in lieu of devaluation. He could apply many of the same remedies that British Chancellor of the Exchequer Roy Jenkins had imposed last week on Britain. He could reduce government spending still further, raise taxes and institute currency and trade controls in an attempt to stanch the outflow of francs.