(3 of 10)
Other reporters waited in the courtyard of the Elysée. Two hours passed and no one appeared. The suspicion began to grow that De Gaulle had rewritten the script. At the ministry, the headwaiter put out bottles of J&B and mineral water to appease the impatient reporters. After three hours and 35 minutes, the Cabinet ministers filed out of the palace, silent, unsmiling and uncommunicative. Finally, Information Minister Joël le Theule showed up at the ministry for the briefing. By this time, the tension was great. The Paris afternoon papers were holding their evening editions for the final details of the devaluation. Instead of making the announcement about devaluation, Le Theule read a routine statement that financial and economic matters had been discussed. But he omitted any reference to devaluation. The President himself, said Le Theule, would make the statement about the franc. "When? When?" cried the newsmen, who chased Le Theule into a corner of the room. He repeated only: "That's all I can tell you. I'm sorry, I'm sorry." Later, at 7:45 that evening, French radio and television interrupted their broadcasts with a special bulletin from the Elysée: "The present parity of the French franc is maintained." Obviously, just saying so would not make the franc stable, but the assertion was itself a startling and audacious act. How had it happened?
Sting of Humiliation
De Gaulle got out of bed on the morning of the decisive day in an "extremely grouchy mood," according to those Elysée insiders who find deep international significance in the servants' chronicling of every presidential burp and hint of indigestion. Later in the morning he had long private sessions with two old economic advisers: Jean-Marcel Jeanneney, 58, a statist economist, and Roger Goetze, 55, who was the general's financial adviser when he returned to power and devalued the franc in 1958. De Gaulle was weighing the question of devaluation in much the same manner as he pondered the issue of whether to resign or during the riots in May. By the tim the Cabinet met, De Gaulle had in all likelihood made his decision. Even so, he gave his ministers a full hearing.
De Gaulle called first on Finance Minister François Ortoli to sum up the Bonn meeting. Ortoli stressed that although the Ten broke up with the clear understanding that France was about to devalue ("and not at a rate much beyond 10%"), he had not given any pledge that France would follow through. Furthermore, he said that a fund of $2 billion to support the franc, created in Bonn, was given with no strings attached. There was some passion in Ortoli's voice as he described how France had been "pressured" into considering devaluation after the Germans refused to revalue the mark. He told of the Germans' jubilation when it seemed to them that they had won the day. Although De Gaulle had heard all this before, it was the first time that the majority of ministers had learned of the "humiliation" in Bonn. Then, one by one, the other 19 ministers gave their views. Couve de Murville was the last man to offer his opinion, and he advised against devaluation. The other ministers were divided, some for a devaluation of the currency, at varying rates, and others—although a minority—against devaluing at all.