World: THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF PEACE IN VIET NAM

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M-16 rifles. The latter step was particularly important, since the World War II-vintage M-l rifles that had been in use literally kept the army off balance: the joke was half true that the kick of the heavy rifles threw many of the small South Vietnamese two paces back for every shot they fired. Know-how and firepower, however, cannot replace spirit. The best ARVN units certainly do not lack spirit—but the best are relatively few. ARVN's desertion is down, but each month, some 13,000 South Vietnamese still go over the hill. Not all are AWOL by U.S. standards, however; often they merely go home to re-enlist in units stationed nearer their families. The unreadiness of ARVN was, of course, the ostensible reason proffered by Secretary Laird for retreating, publicly at least, on any U.S. troop withdrawals this year.

He had, unfortunately, some reason for taking that position. Thieu has managed to make the selection and promotion of ARVN officers considerably more democratic than it had been in the past, and a select group of colonels attending the first classes in Saigon's plush new National Defense College has begun to explore highly sophisticated defense scenarios. But many of the training programs take so long to complete that they have still not affected the army's real performance. Pilot training, for example, takes fully two years, half of it English-language instruction. Men in the ranks are woefully underpaid (a private's salary: $25 a month) and must serve for the duration rather than any specific term. When U.S. advisers set about beefing up the South Vietnamese military, they were confident that the result would be substantial increases in ARVN battle contacts with the Communists—meaning that the South Vietnamese would seek out and fight the Communists more aggressively. Some of this has occurred, but only in roughly the same proportion as simple manpower expansion.

Ultimately, the ARVN's performance and that of the government are inseparable. The government rules the country (as best it can) largely through the army; the army in turn depends on the morale and confidence the government can create among the people. The ARVN, like the U.S., must look for leadership to the short (5 ft. 5 in.), graying former career general who has been fighting the Communists since he joined the French army in 1947. President Nguyen Van Thieu's generally unspectacular rise through the military ranks—as well as an equally pedestrian campaign for the presidency—has left many in doubt of Thieu's skill and style as a politician.

Thieu the Politician

Yet behind what one ambassador to Saigon calls his "Boy Scout" mien lurks a first-rate political mind. For one thing, Thieu is the only general among those who helped to oust the Diem regime to have survived in power. No less an accomplishment was his success in drafting the dashing Nguyen Cao Ky as his running mate, and then skillfully outflanking Ky's bid for power after the election. Thieu has also enlisted the services of another rival, Moderate Presidential Candidate Tran Van Huong, as Premier. In all this, Thieu has emerged as a politician with a certain amount of Oriental style. "Those around him say he is extremely crafty, which in Saigon is a high form of praise," says one observer. "He remains very still in the midst of a situation, and