World: THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF PEACE IN VIET NAM

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through secret channels to negotiate troop withdrawals—and drafting detailed plans with the Saigon government on the logistics of a reduction. On the diplomatic front, secret talks between the U.S. and North Viet Nam aimed at scaling down the level of fighting have almost certainly begun in Paris and other points, despite Administration disclaimers. President Nixon's decision not to resume bombing North Viet Nam in retaliation for the current offensive by the Communists represents an important policy decision not to turn the clock back in Viet Nam, even though the South Vietnamese government is urging the bombing of Hanoi and U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker has added his weight to their plea.

Nixon feels that he must retain "the ability to make 20 moves or more at the same time," as one top adviser puts it —and make them largely in secrecy. He must maintain the pressure on the battlefield, but not so intensely that Hanoi breaks off the peace talks in Paris. He must continue preparing the South Vietnamese to assume more responsibility, but not undercut them by bargaining with the North behind their backs. He must allow the Saigon government to negotiate as an equal partner, but not permit it to exhaust U.S. public patience by foot dragging. In all this, an essential element is the reliability of the South Vietnamese government and the man who runs it, President Nguyen Van Thieu.

Fortunately, the U.S. can finally count on a reasonably secure and stable government in Saigon. For that, and for the first tentative signs that it is preparing its people for the day when they will have to shoulder the burden of their war, the U.S. in large part can thank Thieu, the solitary, sometimes enigmatic but increasingly forceful President of South Viet Nam. In the 17 months he has held office, Thieu has constructed the strongest government in South Viet Nam since the days of Ngo Dinh Diem, whose overthrow he helped to plan. Amid the ceaseless intrigues of Saigon politics, he has persuaded some former rivals to join his government and, more important, has given South Viet Nam's fledgling institutions a measure of legality. That gives hope for the future, and makes the government virtually coup-proof for the present. No Saigon politician—not even the anti-Communist opponents of Thieu's government—wants to go back to the bad old days of revolving governments.

Prognosis of Progress

Beyond Thieu and his government, the situation depends on other factors: the military performance by both the U.S. and the South Vietnamese army, the pace of pacification, the strength and morale of the enemy. "Progress" in Viet Nam is a relative and fragile thing at best. But within limits, a prognosis of progress seems more valid than at any time since the U.S. arrived.

The history of the war is all too painfully graven in false optimism. Again and again, U.S. hopes have been raised by officials armed with gleaming statistics and pollyanna rhetoric. First the U.S. "turned the corner" in Viet Nam; then there was "light at the end of the tunnel," "the enemy was on the run," and the attrition rates, the kill ratios, and all the other jargon of victory rolled on and on. Since they have been proved wrong so often in the past, U.S. experts are careful not to parade their latest positive assessments; indeed,