(2 of 3)
During the uproar, the British government refrained from throwing more oil on the fire. In a major speech at Liverpool, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan answered the Gaullist criticism that Britain had "special ties" with the U.S. and the Commonwealth by pointing out that France also retained special ties with its former colonies. He argued cogently that in the second half of this century no one free nation could seek to dominate other free nations, adding: "Nor can any country in these days stand entirely on its own. Alliances are essential to security." Britain would continue the patient struggle to win a place in Europe, said Harold Macmillan. Its Common Market negotiator Edward Heath was already back in Brussels, ready to take his seat at the negotiating table.
Common English. Neither Britain nor any other European nation had a basic objection to the sight of France and Germany burying the hatchet after generations of enmity. But it seemed a futile gesture at best; the Common Market itself seemed sufficient means to weld the two old foes in common cause. In any case, the treaty, which pledges both governments to cooperation in defense, foreign policy, education and youth affairs, seems more sentimental than serious. Asked what precisely the treaty added to existing Franco-German ties, a top French official said vaguely, "It depends on what develops." Skeptical newsmen joked that it was a "treaty to come to dinner," and noted the irony in the fact that when the Defense Ministers of France and West Germany sat down to talk, the only language they had in common was English.
Looking Out. The U.S. made no secret of its stand on the Common Market. In Washington, President Kennedy asked: "What kind of a Europe do they want? Do they want one looking out or looking in? What do they see as the balance of forces in the world today?" He underlined the "peculiar logic" of De Gaulle, which sees Britain and the U.S. as enemies, when "the reality of the danger is that all free men and nations live under the constant threat of the Communist advance." U.S. concern, Kennedy conceded, was not totally unselfish. Washington hopes that British membership in the Common Market will help build a united Europe that can share with the U.S. the burden of solving the problems of the world's have-not nations.
In Manhattan to receive an award from Freedom House, France's Jean Monnet, the father of the Common Market, took direct issue with De Gaulle. "Entry into Europe would be good for Britain, for Europe, for the West and for world peace," he declared. "There are urgent problems which neither Europe nor America can settle alone. These are, to my mind, the monetary stability of the West, the organization of agriculture in an increasingly industrial world, help to the developing countries to speed their growth, and of course, the freeing of trade to be negotiated between yourselves and the Common Market."
Old Principle. As for U.S. intentions, viewed with such suspicion in Paris, Monnet reminded De Gaulle that ever since the 1947 Marshall Plan, the U.S. has worked for European union: "For once, the most powerful country in the world has helped others to unite instead of adopting the old principle of divide and rule."