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To the Old Guard charge that from the 1956 elections came a mandate for conservatism, the Eisenhower Republicans ask: Who won the elections? Their answer: Dwight Eisenhower won (actually in 329 out of 435 congressional districts) —and so, in the main, did the congressional Democrats who had worked long, hard and effectively to sell the idea that they, not the Republicans, would best support the Eisenhower program. Ask the Ikemen: How can the Old Guard possibly consider the election of a Democratic Congress a mandate for Republican conservatism?
As for the charge that Eisenhower has somehow changed (or been changed by a mysterious "they") since 1956, "they" point out that virtually all the major proposals in Ike's 1957 program were recommended by "him" in previous years, and formally affirmed in the platform of 1956.
The Reasons Why
If the right-wing case is fallible, why has it gained so much headway? The answer, made even by Ike supporters: President Eisenhower has let it.
In retrospect, one of the most important of all Dwight Eisenhower's 1952 campaign declarations was his promise to restore the prestige of the presidency, to be the President of all the people. In keeping that promise, he has generally stood above the give-and-take that goes with another presidential responsibility: the responsibility of being a party leader. Ike seems to find something distasteful in precinct-level party politics. On the one hand, he has bestowed few favors on Eisenhower loyalists, and he has avoided giving them active leadership in their congressional fight against the Old Guard. On the other hand, he has refused even to show presidential displeasure with those who make political gains by attacking his budgetary program, e.g., the Barry Goldwaters, Bill Knowlands (or even the George Humphreys). Ike's detachment is one of the reasons for his popularity; it is also one of the reasons for his party's troubles.
Despite all the ruckus kicked up by the Old Guard, Eisenhower Republicanism is dominant within the Republican Party. But the President, say downcast Ikemen, must use it functionally. Some highly realistic Eisenhower Republicans are determined that Ike must pay some attention to political details that bear so heavily on party morale; he must give his followers the same political support he expects them to give him; he must use his prestige to impose sanctions on the hatchet-throwers. An example of what can be done is found in the series of regional meetings being held by G.O.P. National Chairman Meade Alcorn. The first two, in Omaha and Providence, were near disasters, with Eisenhower sending perfunctory hope-you-are-well notes and the reactionaries making all the noise and most of the news. But to the next two, in Salt Lake City and Louisville, President Eisenhower sent fighting messages on behalf of his sort of Republicanism. Result: Alcorn, who had been down in the dumps, came away vastly encouraged by the response and much more hopeful for the Republican future.